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ABSTRACT 
The underrepresentation of women in national parliaments is a phenomenon that 
plagues much of the world, with the Baltic Sea Region being no exception.  Two 
countries, Estonia and Poland, are chosen for comparative analysis in this paper, as they 
possess different cultures and histories, but have similar results in regards to female 
representation at a national level. The comparison provides insight into the situation 
women face in politics in two post-communist states in Central and Eastern Europe. 
This paper will examine the trends in the proportion of female representatives in Poland 
and Estonia’s national parliaments in the transition from communism to democracy and 
post-transition periods.  The work seeks to conceptualize why women in Poland and 
Estonia continue to be grossly underrepresented in the upper echelons of power by 
employing R.W. Connell’s concept of hegemonic masculinity. Hegemonic masculinity 
entails the cultural force that both dominates and subordinates femininity as well as 
other masculinities, thus resulting in low proportions of women in the national 
parliaments of the new countries examined. Three time periods are developed for a 
fuller analysis of changes in the amount of women seated in the upper echelons of 
power: the communist period, the transition period, 1989-2004, and the post-transition 
period, 2004-2012. The work notes the changes in gender equality policies in each 
country after the accession to the European Union in 2004 and the possibilities of 
greater gender equality in each state. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Though women make up over half of the world’s population, they only represent 
21 percent of the world’s parliamentarians.1 This trend is no different in the post-
communist states of Europe. The noticeable low proportion of women in the parliaments 
continues to be prevalent in the post-communist states, despite the past socialist 
ideology of gender equality.  By looking at female politicians in national parliaments, 
one can gather the views and situation of women at the upper echelons of society, where 
change can come about from the top.  Although the women at the top are an elite, they 
are elected representatives, and the trends among women engaged in politics make for 
an interesting study in the overall climate for gender equality in a country. 
With this, a more specific examination of the post-communist experience of two 
countries, Estonia and Poland, could yield interesting insights into the phenomenon of 
low numbers of women in government. The countries differ drastically in size, with 
Estonia having almost 1.3 million inhabitants and Poland possessing over 38 million, 
but both only have around twenty percent women making up their parliaments. Both 
countries experienced a severe drop in female representatives at the time of transition in 
the early 1990s and both continued to have low numbers of women present in the 
national parliaments and governments.  
Estonia, as a former part of the Soviet Union, provides an example of a small 
country that has made great strides in its transformation from a Soviet republic to one of 
the luminary Baltic States.  The country is commonly cited as one of Europe’s least 
religious countries, yet possesses traditional views on gender in its society, with women 
being assigned to the domestic sphere and men holding responsibility for the public 
sphere. The country also possesses the greatest pay gap among men and women in the 
European Union,
                                                            
1 Inter-Parliamentary Union, last modified 2013, http://www.ipu.org 
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with women making only 77 percent compared to the wages and salaries of their male 
counterparts.2 Estonia also looks to its Nordic neighbors in many ways, from diplomacy 
to culture, but has not yet adopted the rigorous gender quotas and policies that the 
Nordic states have enforced in their countries. Although Estonia is a small country in 
the north-east of Europe, with its Soviet past and traditional cultural values, Estonia 
provides a very interesting and complicated backdrop for analysis of trends among 
female parliamentarians. 
Poland, on the other hand, experienced domestic communist rule, under the 
influence of the Soviets, and has also made great progress to integrate with its near 
Western neighbors, particularly Germany. Poland can be seen as the stronghold of 
Catholicism in Europe, citing almost 90% of its population as Roman Catholics and 
75% of its inhabitants actually practicing the religion.3 The traditional gender roles 
associated with Catholicism are accepted throughout Polish society. Poland has been at 
the center of the abortion debate for its conservative views on the procedure, leaving 
many to criticize Poland as hostile to women’s concerns. Poland, after leaving behind 
communism, has emphasized its past traditions, leaving women in a difficult position in 
an increasingly modern society.  As the largest post-communist states of the former 
Soviet bloc, Poland provides an interesting contrast to Estonia in an attempt to 
understand the position of women in the respective societies.  
Despite possessing different cultures, languages, values, and histories, the two 
countries have experienced the same outcome in regards to the proportion of female 
representatives in the representative bodies. The two countries provide a fruitful 
comparison in regards to the post-communist experience and the treatment of gender 
equality. Both Estonia and Poland experienced Soviet rule and have successfully 
transitioned to democracy and capitalism and joined the European Union, thus providing 
a solid foundation for statistical comparison.  
 This thesis explores further explanations for low numbers of women in national 
parliaments than what is contained in the existing literature by examining the social 
foundations of gender and how the concept of hegemonic masculinity, theorized in 
R.W. Connell’s 1987 seminal work, Gender and Power, can help explain why women 
                                                            
2 RT, “Women in Estonia Suffer From EU’s Worst Gender Pay Gap,” last modified July 26, 2010, 
http://rt.com/news/estonia-gender-pay-gap/ 
3 CIA Factbook, Poland 
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continue to be grossly underrepresented in national bodies. The thesis adds to a vast 
array of literature that explores the conditions and challenges faced by women during 
the democratic transition in Central and Eastern Europe. The period after around 1999 
leaves much to be desired in the literature on women in the post-communist states, 
notably Poland and Estonia. Though certain years/elections have been explored, a 
comparison of two more recent members to the European Union and the effects of the 
gender equality policies and directives is warranted.  
Three periods will be examined in each case study: the communist past, from the 
end of the Stalinist period, the transition to democracy, which, in this work, will span a 
decade from 1989 to 2004, and the post-transition period, 2005-2013. The period of the 
communist past is examined to provide background in order to better understand the 
situation women faced and their role in communist power structures in each case study. 
The period spanning from 1989-2004 is explored as the time before both states became 
members of international organizations, thus, affecting the policies of gender equality. 
The period 1989-2004 is considered in this thesis as the transition period, noting the 
significance of the transition from communism to democracy and capitalism. The period 
of 1989-2004 also allowed for each country to hold at least four democratic elections for 
the parliament. Finally, the period from 2005 to the contemporary period, written as 
post-transition, shows the effects of accession to international bodies on the proportion 
of female representation in the national parliaments of Estonia and Poland.  
It is argued that women in the cases of Estonia and Poland are continuously 
unequal in representative bodies because the hegemonic masculinity and the gender 
norms of the culture prevent equilibrium between the sexes of being established in the 
decision-making institutions of the state. Moreover, the concept of hegemonic 
masculinity explored later in the work is malleable, rather than a static concept, 
allowing for change in a society’s view of gender, masculinity, and femininity and thus 
for more female representatives, as was witnessed throughout the 1990s and 2000s in 
both case studies. The overall research question of this work is why are women, even 
after regime change and the development of democracy, significantly underrepresented 
in national parliaments and governments in the post-communists states? Furthermore, 
this study seeks to answer what explanations could be put forth to explore the inherent 
gender inequality in the upper echelons of power in these states? Additionally, have 
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Estonia and Poland evolved in their gender equality policies from above, through 
legislation, and if so, what were the catalysts? 
The research method of this study consists of secondary source analysis, the use 
and analysis of data from surveys conducted through different time periods in each 
country (including Inglehart’s World Values Survey), and analysis of governmental 
legislation on gender equality. Additionally, for more contemporary information and 
data, a survey was sent out to female parliamentarians electronically in the language of 
the respective country, gauging the views and beliefs of the current female 
parliamentarians. 
The work will begin with a review of the relevant literature that has been written 
on the topic of female representation in post-communist parliaments. The literature 
review explores two main themes found within the literature, that of the challenges 
faced by women in the transition to capitalism and democracy and the divide between 
the East and West on the place of feminism in the post-communist situation. From there, 
the work will delve into theoretical models and methodological approaches. R.W. 
Connell’s concept of hegemonic masculinity will be explored, along with later academic 
discourse on the concept. The theoretical section employs the use of secondary literature 
that explores the notions of masculinity and femininity in a society, and how these 
concepts prevent women from gaining equality on all levels. The methodology used in 
this study will also be elaborated upon and conceptualized. The first case study, Estonia, 
will then be examined following the time periods set out above. The fluctuations of 
women in the Riigikogu will be analyzed in an attempt to show that the hegemonic 
masculinity present in Estonian society has prevented women from occupying more 
seats in the parliament. The second case study, Poland, will be examined in a similar 
way with similar purposes. From the case studies, a comparative analysis will be 
developed in showing the presence and the effects of a hegemonic masculinity in each 
country. Finally, some concluding remarks with recommendations for future study are 
developed.   
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CHAPTER 1 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
The underlying gender relations and the prevalence of hegemonic masculinity in 
the cultures of the post-communist states are acknowledged in the academic work and 
historiography that has been written on the transition and post-communist situations of 
Central and Eastern Europe. The exploration of women’s challenges during the periods 
has been covered quite well by a number of authors, most of whom are women. The 
literature on the transition period and the post-transition period are essential in 
understanding the situation that women faced in each of the respective time periods 
before an examination of the specific cases of Estonia and Poland can be explored. Two 
prevailing themes can be dissected from the literature, one that focuses on the 
challenges women faced after the transition and the emphasized divide between the East 
and the West in regards to the place of feminism in the post-communist states.  
 
 
1.1 Challenges of the Transition 
 
In addition to the loss of social benefits and the increase in economic burdens, 
women lost a significant portion of their parliamentary seats after the elimination of the 
gender quotas guaranteed under communism. Women’s representation in national 
parliaments at the time of transition fell from an average of about 30 percent in the latter 
years of communism to less than 10 percent, and as Richard Matland and Kathleen 
Montgomery highlight, some countries had below 5 percent of women in their national 
parliaments after the fall of communism.4 Matland and Montgomery note further, “More 
                                                            
4 Richard E Matland and Kathleen A. Montgomery, eds. Women’s Access to Political Power in Post-
Communist Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 1. 
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than a decade after founding democratic elections in the region, the mean level of 
female representation, at around 12 percent, remained slightly below the world average 
(14 percent) and well below the Western European mean (25 percent).”5 The significant 
drop in women’s presence in parliaments as well as the unequal hardship faced by 
women during the transition was noted and examined by many scholars, leaving a vast 
literature on the topic. 
A range of trying changes affecting women in the societies in transition was 
witnessed during the shaky regime change from communist to democratic governance in 
the early 1990s. The appearance of a free market economy brought about a drastic rise 
in unemployment, a phenomenon that had been virtually unknown in communist times. 
Women were particular affected, comprising 70 percent of the unemployed throughout 
the 1990s.6  Continued high rates of domestic violence and economic discrimination 
prevented greater gender equality in newly democratic societies, and these trends were 
reinforced by the resurgence of traditional cultural norms and mores.7   
Along with these trends, the double burden of women in society of being 
expected to provide for the family both domestically and economically prevented the 
growth of the political activism that would help to persuade the general public of the 
need for reform in the realm of women’s issues. “This comparison between past and 
present within East Central European countries reveals an absolute drop in female 
representation. On average, women held about one third of the seats in state socialist 
parliaments. By contrast they account for less than one in ten parliamentarians in most 
of the democratically elected parliaments,” according to a study of the early 1990s.8 The 
arrival of capitalism, like communism, required women to be responsible for 
contributing to the household income as well as taking care of domestic responsibilities, 
hence the continuation of the double burden. The consolidation of the double burden 
under communism left a bitter taste in many women’s mouths in regards to feminism 
and women’s liberation.  The issues facing women under communism continued to 
                                                            
5 Ibid, 1. 
6 Robert G. Moser, Unexpected Outcomes: Electoral Systems, Political Parties, and Representation in 
Russia (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001), 57. 
7 For a more detailed description of the problem of violence against women and economic discrimination 
in Post-communist Europe, see Janet Elise Johnson, Gender Violence in Russia: the Politics of Feminist 
Intervention (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2009) and Barbara Einhorn, Cinderella Goes to 
the Market: Citizenship, Gender, and Women’s Movements in East Central Europe (New York: Verso, 
1993). 
8 Einhorn, 151. 
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plague the paternalistic societies with the arrival of democracy, leaving women behind 
in governmental affairs and preventing the establishment of greater gender equality as a 
whole.  
Facing economic hardship, experiencing discrimination in all facets of society, 
and losing many social welfare services that had been provided by the Soviet or 
communist government in many cases, women were in an undesirable situation 
throughout the post-communist sphere at the time of transition. Furthermore, the 
revamping of nationalist fervor in many countries, led to the reappearance of traditional 
gender roles, although they arguably never disappeared but were disguised under 
communist ideology.9 Tanya Renne edited a collection of essays devoted to examining 
the “Sisterhood of Europe,” and an extensive quotation from her introduction provides 
great insight into the discourse on the resurgence of nationalism, and subsequently, the 
subordination of women at the time of transition: 
 National customs and traditions were embraced with a rediscovered 
enthusiasm, and religion began to occupy a primary place in many 
people’s lives. With these new pleasures and responsibilities, most 
countries harkened back to former “free” periods, periods before World 
War II, Nazi occupation, and Soviet ‘liberation.’ New conservative 
politicians sought to bring their countries back to ‘true,’ untainted-by-
communism identities.10 
These ‘untainted-by-communism identities’ required a reversion to the past, in which 
traditional gender roles were practiced and enforced through cultural norms and values. 
The historiography of the situation of women during the transition period continuously 
points to the reversion to past values. These past values further subordinated and 
burdened women in those societies in transition, placing more responsibility on women 
to remain in the realm of while the economic situation required their presence in the 
labor force. One place women were not responsible for with the revival of nationalism 
was the realm of politics and government, leaving this a traditionally male-dominated 
arena. 
                                                            
9 Ibid, 150. 
10Tanya Renne, ed. Ana’s Land: Sisterhood in Eastern Europe (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 
1997), 1. 
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Barbara Einhorn, in her much cited Cinderella goes to the Market, written in 
1993, argues that “the ambiguities in the situation of women both ‘before and ‘after’: 
namely, that, despite clear improvements in the civil and political rights associated with 
democratic citizenship, in the short run at least women in East Central Europe stand to 
lose economic, social welfare, and reproductive rights.”11  Einhorn recognized the 
inequality experienced by women both before and after the transition, pointing to the 
lack of hope that accompanied the democratic transition for the women of East-Central 
Europe. Despite gaining an open area for public discourse, namely civil society, women 
lost their social benefits, such as daycare, and many of their reproductive rights, as seen 
with the outcome of the abortion debate in Poland in the early 1990s. Einhorn correctly 
noted, “Moreover, a newly dominant discourse threatens to subordinate women’s 
citizenships rights in many cases to the goals of nationalist projects.”12 The reversion to 
nationalist practices and ideas not only attempted to erase all aspects of communism, 
including many of its social benefits, but it also further subordinated women in post-
communist society.  
Einhorn noted, “the shift from opposition ‘anti-politics’ to democratic 
‘normalization’… is marked by a tendency to oust women.”13 The tumultuous transition 
to democracy continuously marginalized and even subordinated women, rather than 
including women in the decision-making processes of regime change. Einhorn further 
explored explanations as to why women’s citizenship was marginalized during the 
democratization process in Eastern and Central Europe, providing a foundation for 
further research. Following Einhorn, the appearance of essay collections from numerous 
authors, such as Gal and Kligman, Jacquette and Wolchik, and Funk and Mueller, 
appeared in an attempt to examine women’s situations throughout the former Soviet 
Bloc by providing comparative approaches.14 
                                                            
11 Einhorn,, 1. 
12 Ibid, 1. 
13 Ibid,148. 
14 Examples of analyses of women in late Soviet society as well as women in post-Soviet and post-
communist society can be found in: Mary Buckley, Post-Soviet Women: from the Baltic to Central Asia 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), Susan Gal and Gail Kligman,Reproducing Gender: 
Politics, Publics, and Everyday Life after Socialism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000),  
Kathleen Kuehnast and Carol Nechemias, eds., Post Soviet Women Encountering Transition: Nation 
Building, Economic Survival, and Civic Activism (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 
2004), and Nanette Funk and Magda Mueller, eds., Gender Politics and Post-Communism: Reflections 
from Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union (New York: Routledge, 1993). 
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Perhaps the most unique work to come out on the discourse of women in 
transition is Jacquette and Wolchik’s comparison of Latin America and Eastern Europe.  
The comparison of Latin America and Eastern Europe provided a very interesting 
analysis of democratic transition in two very different environments. The common 
denominator for comparison of the two regions was that both transitions left a ‘legacy of 
fragility.’15 They argued that, “…the abruptness of the transitions in Central and Eastern 
Europe highlighted the lack of past democratic experience in much of the region and the 
destabilizing potential of right-wing nationalism.”16 Jacquette and Wolchik’s 
comparison, though seemingly unlikely, sought to demonstrate that the lack of 
democratic foundations and traditions in many of the countries allowed for the rise of 
right-wing nationalism and the reemergence of values that had been embraced before 
the arrival of communism and authoritarian regimes. 
Importantly, Jacquette and Wolchik noted, “The struggles for democracy have 
also been struggles for identity, and in both regions, post-transition identities were built 
in part on rejection of the modes and policies of the prior regimes.”17 This point is 
important especially for the republics that were part of the USSR, such as Estonia. The 
transition period was not only a transition to democracy but also a transition for national 
identities and cultural values to be shifted away from Soviet norms and toward 
traditional values. Unfortunately, both sets of norms and values subordinate women and 
overlook them in the processes of government. 
 
 
1.2 East Vs. West 
 
The fall of communism sent a chaotic wave of change across the former Soviet 
Bloc, with previously communist nations adopting democratic institutions and a free-
market economy. A discourse developed at the time of transition among Western and 
Eastern female academics and writers, debating the causes for the decline in women’s 
situations throughout Central and Eastern Europe as well as the role of Western-style 
                                                            
15 Jane S. Jaquette and Sharon L. Wolchik, eds., Women and Democracy: Latin America and Central and 
Eastern Europe (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 3. 
16 Ibid, 3. 
17 Ibid, 4. 
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feminism in the newly democratic nations. The discourse among the authors cited a 
reversion to traditional values after the fall of communism as the cause of a severe drop 
in the proportion of women in national parliaments and often focused on the dichotomy 
of “East vs. West” in terms of feminist thought. The authors, at times, developed in-
fighting on the academic level over abstract ideas rather than providing concrete aid in 
improving women’s situations in the transition to democracy.18 The differing views of 
women’s role in society between Western players and post-communist women are one 
of the root causes of the failure in developing a solid women’s movement throughout 
the post-communist bloc.  Views of women as part of the collective group under 
socialism differ greatly from the views of women as individualist actors under 
capitalism. Different histories, cultures, and values are important explanations for why 
the Western feminist movement has not taken off successfully in Central and Eastern 
European countries.  This discourse continued throughout the 1990s until the number of 
elections in the countries increased and the number of women in parliaments gradually 
rose, which generated new criteria for analysis rather than a simple explanation for why 
Western feminism was not vigorously adopted in the post-communist states. 
In addition to examining the rise in nationalist sentiments that marginalized 
women further from participation in political institutions, the literature about the 
transition examined a seemingly inherent conflicting dichotomy of Eastern vs. Western 
women and the implementation of feminism in the newly democratic nations. The 
literature often suggests that with the adoption of Western feminism, women’s issues 
would be acknowledged and solved through the democratic processes, though Western 
feminism had also recently faced its own idiosyncrasies and gray areas in the Western 
democracies.  At the same time, however, the literature points to the lack of interest of 
Eastern European women in the concept of feminism. Einhorn wrote, “Unlike the West, 
where any gains in equality of opportunity or the elimination of discrimination on 
grounds of sex have been the outcome of prolonged political struggle from below, 
governments in state socialist countries were officially committed to a policy of 
                                                            
18 A prime example of this can be seen with the academic bickering between Funk and Drakulic, over 
Funk’s supposedly elitist and unrealistic claims and ideas for a collection of essays regarding women in 
Central and Eastern Europe. The dispute is noted in Nanette Funk and Magda Mueller, eds., Gender 
Politics and Post-Communism: Reflections from Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union (New 
York: Routledge, 1993).  
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women’s ‘emancipation’, to be achieved through legislation and social policy.”19 
Women in Eastern Europe did not have to struggle for their emancipation in the latter 
part of the 20th century, but received it through the state and its policies, according to 
Einhorn.  
Einhorn continued by writing of an ‘allergy’ to feminism in Central and Eastern 
Europe.20 Additionally, Tanya Renne noted at the time of transition, “Although 
independent feminism is relatively new to Eastern Europe, it is clearly unwelcome; 
many in these changing nations see it as a threat.”21 The reluctance of Eastern women to 
take in Western-style feminism continues to the present, with ‘feminism’ or ‘feminist’ 
having negative and foreign connotations. Laura Busheikin attempted to uncover certain 
myths about feminism, but her account was written at a time when cooperation was still 
hopeful.22  However, the idea of importing a western-style feminism into Eastern 
Europe was seemingly hopeless, given the region’s past experiences and nationalist 
propaganda against the evils of feminism. The tension between the two camps in 
academia came to a battle of words and ideas between Nanette Funk and Slavenka 
Drakulic.23 Drakulic, a journalist, pointed out that Funk, a Western academic, did not 
understand the situation of women in Eastern Europe, but instead insisted on the use of 
feminism to solve all of Eastern Europe’s woes. This discourse of East vs. West was 
only occurring at the level of academia or among NGOs, providing no discourse or 
discussion for women who could potentially create a grassroots movement for women’s 
issues. The academic in-fighting over Western style feminism seemingly overlooked the 
past experiences and histories of the women as well as men under communism, leaving 
Western feminists with few ideas that seemed attractive to the citizens of Central and 
Eastern Europe. 
The seemingly radical Western feminism carried negative connotations among 
Central and Eastern European women, leaving many to deny that they were ‘feminist,’ 
even if they had feminist leanings and beliefs.24  Although there were a few women, 
                                                            
19 Einhorn, 18. 
20 Ibid, 168. 
21 Renne, 2. 
22 Laura Busheikin, “Is Sisterhood Really Global?: Western Feminism in Eastern Europe,” in Ana’s Land, 
12-21. 
23 Ibid, 14-15. 
24 Explored further below, female politicians still deny being a ‘feminist’ despite their belief that equality 
is important among the genders. 
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mainly scholars and activists, who took on the term ‘feminist,’ the majority of women 
during the 1990s sought change through adhering to cultural norms and mores. Cultural 
feminism, as defined by Kristen Ghodsee, “often aims at meeting women’s special 
needs within the status quo.”25  Instead of embracing and working with the cultural 
feminism seen within the post-communist states, “Western feminists and their local 
counterparts have ignored the complex historical legacies of socialism versus what has 
been called “bourgeois feminism” in the East.”26 The different histories of Western 
countries like the United States and the post-communist states, for example, led to 
conflicts in semantics within not only the women’s movement in different post-
communist countries, but also on a global level as well.  It is through these complex 
legacies and rejection of Western ideals that the successes and failures of women’s 
movements in post-socialist Europe lie, making the movements intriguing cases for 
analysis of the progress of women in societies in the process of change after the fall of 
communism. 
Ghodsee goes on to refer to this Western feminism as a type of ‘cultural 
feminism,’ the idea that women and men are essentially different and therefore, women 
should all unite into a common sisterhood, that Western NGOs have used as an 
ideology, implementing it into the views of local women’s NGOs.27  Many radical 
feminists, a very small minority within Central and Eastern Europe, advocate for 
complete change and even erasure of gender roles, but Ghodsee states that cultural 
feminism in Eastern and Central Europe “looks to find solutions for how the worst 
offenses of patriarchy can be mitigated, while never challenging the social or economic 
relations within which patriarchy thrives.”28  The cultural feminism that the Western 
NGOs are importing reinforces the view that women are in fact different from men and 
should be treated as such, rather than as equal partners in society.  Although Western 
feminism views itself as promoting the stance of women within countries in transition, 
they are in fact, promoting the separation of women from men.  The separation seen in 
the ideology of Western feminism is doing very little to change the views of men and 
                                                            
25Kristen Ghodsee, “Feminism-by-Design: Emerging Capitalism, Cultural Feminism, and Women’s 
Nongovernmental Organizations in Postsocialist Eastern Europe,” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture 
and Society 29 (2004), 728. 
26 Ibid, 728. 
27 Ibid, 728. 
28 Ibid, 728. 
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women in regards to a necessary change in gender relations to address persisting 
inequalities. 
Additionally, the problematic use of ‘feminism’ in post-communist society 
carries with it a weight of negative connotations evoking fantastical images of women 
who scorn men, rather than women who are simply seeking equality with their male 
counterparts.  But it is through the cultivation of an increased number of women 
representatives in national parliaments, a successful and flourishing women’s 
movement, and the work of women’s groups in political, domestic, and economic 
realms that the term “feminism” will eventually lead to positive connotations among 
citizens, both male and female. This is not to say that the term ‘feminist,’ with its façade 
of Western hegemony, must be adopted into the discourse on gender equality, but 
perhaps if the term is revisited for its content rather than its associations, a fuller 
understanding of the necessity of greater gender equality in a democratic state might be 
realized.    
The academic debate in the 1990s on why Western-style feminism was not being 
accepted in Eastern Europe perhaps missed the bigger picture of why there was 
inequality with the transition to democracy in the first place. The relative absence of 
feminism and a large following of feminists cannot be viewed as a sole reason for the 
drastic decline in women’s position in post-communist societies. Richard Matland and 
Kathleen Montgomery write, “Communism usurped the language of feminist 
emancipation, but in praxis women were marginalized across economic, political, and 
social spheres. As a result, women found themselves at a structural disadvantage vis-à-
vis men in competitive elections; and feminism was thoroughly discredited as an 
ideology and basis for political action.”29 The rejection of feminism was historically 
founded, yet the debate continued among western and eastern academics, leading to the 
muddling of possible solutions to the problems women faced. 
It is from the foundation of the literature that has been written on women in the 
post-communist transition and through the application of the concept of hegemonic 
masculinity that the case studies of Estonia and Poland will be examined. The 
exploration into the experiences of women in politics in Estonia and Poland will begin 
with a brief look into the situation of women under communism in the specific 
                                                            
29 Matland and Montgomery, 6. 
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countries, an examination of the trends of the election of women into the representative 
democratic institutions, and a look into the cultural values and norms that promote or 
hinder the election of women, almost a quarter of a century after the fall of communism.  
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CHAPTER 2  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
2.1 The Concept of Hegemonic Masculinity 
 
Many explanations have been put forth in an attempt to understand the steep 
drop in female representatives in post-communist governments in the first years of 
transition, as well as the continuation of gender inequality in political institutions of 
power in contemporary post-communist states. An additional inquiry into why women 
failed to gain equality in representation under communism is also warranted in order to 
understand the contemporary situation more fully. The failure of the communist system 
to fully liberate women, placing women in a double burden of housework and 
employment left many women at a severe disadvantage to their male counterparts at the 
beginning of the transition in the early 1990s. These factors are often cited as leaving 
women apathetic towards politics and preventing them from running for office or 
becoming representatives in their governments. This apathy, as the argument follows, 
leaves women out of the upper echelons of power. This is a simplification of 
complicated arguments and research on women in post-communist societies, but a look 
into the cultural foundations of the gender inequality through both historical eras in 
these societies could prove fruitful for further analysis. 
Although those arguments certainly have shed insight into the experiences of 
women during communism and the post-communist transition, perhaps the low levels of 
participation in political institutions of women can be explained in a different way by 
examining how women and men are viewed within each society, what stereotypes are 
present, and what forces are at work that have caused inherent gender inequality. An 
intriguing concept that employs and analyzes the representation of men and women in a 
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given society emerged in the 1980s with R.W. Connell’s work on sex role theory.  In his 
work, Connell denied the singularity and static nature of the male sex role and explored 
the concept of hegemonic masculinity and its effects on the workings of gender and sex 
in a society.30 Sex role theory focused solely on the dichotomy of male and female, and 
their respective roles in society, leaving no room for the malleable nature of social roles. 
More recent research has found that sex role theory also failed to recognize the 
“existence of a multiplicity of femininities and masculinities” and placed anything that 
did not fit neatly into the dichotomy of male and female, such as transsexual, into a third 
category of ‘deviance’ rather than seeking to expand the views on gender relations.31 
Connell wrote in his 1987 seminal piece, Gender and Power, “The large-scale 
structures of gender relations are constituted by practices.”32 The large scale structure of 
gender relations in the post-communist states can be witnessed by the continuous 
election of a large proportion of men to the national representative bodies, as well as the 
continual and consistent appointment of men to top government positions. The practice 
of continually electing men to positions of power keeps women from occupying these 
positions, but furthermore from becoming equal with men in the large scale structure of 
gender relations. Looking at the state for sources of inequality, Connell argued that “the 
state both institutionalizes hegemonic masculinity and expends great energy in 
controlling it.”33  Therefore, by analyzing the lack of female representatives in political 
institutions which possess state power, one can begin to understand the social structure 
of a society by looking at the more micro-level social structure of an institution, such as 
a national representative body. Through looking at the relations and interactions 
between the sexes, one can begin to understand the foundation for the inequality seen in 
the upper echelons of power.  Therefore, in addition to examining why women are 
under-represented in political institutions in Poland and Estonia, this thesis seeks to 
understand how inequality between the sexes has persisted despite ideological and 
governmental changes and whether the future holds hope for greater equality. 
                                                            
30 R.W. Connell’s 1987 study that greatly influenced the conceptualization and understanding of 
masculinities in modern society, which was, Gender and power: Society, the Person and Sexual Politics 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987). 
31Demtrakis  Demetriou, “Connell’s Concept of Hegemonic Masculinity: A Critique,” Theory and 
Society, 20, 3 (June 2001) 339.  
32Connell (1987), 17. 
33 Ibid, 128. 
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Connell’s ideas on masculinity and the male sex role emerged out of work 
associated with second wave feminism that attempted to understand the sources of 
patriarchy and gender inequality in modern society.  Hegemonic masculinity allows for 
an interesting perspective on problems identified in feminist literature, including the 
continuation of patriarchy and gender inequality in the post-modern era. Connell was 
able to contrast much of his work with the ideas of the emerging feminist literature, 
providing a view that often went unnoticed in feminist literature, such as the notion of 
present and multiple masculinities and a subordinated femininity. Demetrakis 
Demetriou, adding to Connell, explains, “Patriarchy is therefore not a simple question of 
men dominating women, as some feminists have assumed, but it is a complex structure 
of gender relations in which the interrelation between different forms of masculinity and 
femininity plays a central role.”34 Demetriou offered a critique of Connell, but also 
pointed to the importance of examining gender relations.  
Connell uses the idea of masculinity by noting, “Masculinity is not a fixed entity 
embedded in the body or personality traits of individuals. Masculinities are 
configurations of practice that are accomplished in social action and, therefore, can 
differ according to the gender relations in a particular social setting.”35 Masculinity is 
not static in the sense of a physical being or concrete traits, but it evolves over time, 
embracing different characteristics that it may deem threatening to its hegemonic status. 
By basing his argument on Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, Connell found many basic 
similarities in class and gender relations, pointing to intricate power relations between 
the groups that lead to domination and subordination.36 However, in Connell’s terms, 
“Hegemony did not mean violence, although it could be supported by force; it meant 
ascendancy achieved through culture, institutions, and persuasion.”37 Hegemonic 
masculinity, though the idea entails a version of a male that is violent and aggressive, is 
not violent in and of itself, but is peaceably incorporated into a society by its people’s 
practices. Furthermore, as Justin Charlebois explains, “The complementary and 
hierarchical relationship between masculinity and femininity implies domination 
                                                            
34 Ibid, 343. 
35 R.W.Connell and James W. Messerschmidt, “Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the Concept,” 
Gender and Society, 19, 6 (Dec., 2005), 836.  
36 Demetriou, 345. 
37 Connell and Messerschmidt., 832. 
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through consent and not force (i.e., hegemony).”38  Therefore, masculinity retains its 
hegemonic power within a culture through the acceptance and consent of a people, 
rather than by overt force or explicit propaganda. 
Connell’s study of hegemonic masculinity then looked “to how masculinity 
constructs dominance and remains in control.”39 The retained dominance of a singular 
masculinity is reinforced by the continued performance of cultural norms and values 
that allow for the hegemonic masculinity to keep all other masculinities, as well as 
women and femininities, subordinate and marginalized. Connell and Messerschmidt 
write:  
Hegemonic masculinity was not assumed to be normal in the statistical 
sense; only a minority of men might enact it. But it was certainly 
normative. It embodied the currently most honored way of being a man, 
it required all other men to position themselves in relation to it, and it 
ideologically legitimated the global subordination of women to men.40 
The characteristics of hegemonic masculinity, based on a Western ideal, characterizes 
the male as heterosexual, competitive, powerful, aggressive, economically successful, 
and stoic.41  It is the ideal of ‘masculine’ and being a ‘man’ that is continuously 
reinforced through norms and practices that allow this ideal to retain its hegemony.. 
Hegemonic masculinity is very public and portrayed continuously in the media, 
allowing it to appear as if all men should possess the emphasized characteristics, when 
in reality the majority of men do not.42 The masculine characteristics, therefore, often 
occupy the public realm in society, the realm that possesses the majority of overall 
power. The normative power of hegemonic masculinity allows gender inequality to 
continue to be institutionalized and continued throughout generations, as well as 
changes in regimes.  
                                                            
38 Justin Charlebois, Gender and the Construction of Hegemonic and Oppositional Femininities 
(Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2011), 30. 
39Ami Lynch, “Hegemonic Masculinity,” in Jodi O’Brien, ed. Encyclopedia of Gender and Society 
(Thousand Oaks, California:SAGE Publishers, 2009), 411-413. Additionally, Justin Charlebois writes, 
“Masculine embodied social actions include demonstrating authority, control, independence, competitive 
individualism, aggressiveness, the capacity for violence, and permissive heterosexuality. Since difference 
is the cornerstone of masculinity and femininity, embodied social actions associated with femininity 
include compliance, dependence on others—particularly men—cooperative ability, passivity, and 
conservative sexuality.”; Charlebois, 21-22.  
40 Connell and Messerschmidt, 832. 
41 Encyclopedia of Gender and Society, “Hegemonic Masculinity,” 412. 
42 Connell (1987), 185. 
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It was through the denial of the singularity of the male sex role found in sex role 
theory that Connell developed the idea of the existence of multiple masculinities in a 
culture, with one set of norms and ideas possessing hegemony over the other 
masculinities as well as enforcing the subordination of women and femininity. 
Furthermore, Demetriou examines two types of hegemonic masculinity; internal 
hegemonic masculinity and external hegemonic masculinity.  Within the first type, 
hegemonic masculinity possesses control and power over the other, subordinate 
masculinities. A subordinate masculinity, in this sense, can be characterized as 
possessing distinctly feminine characteristics, like being nurturing or emotional, or can 
be seen in the characterization of homosexuality in males.   
Demetriou expands on the internal hegemony by saying, “hegemonic 
masculinity is not a purely white or heterosexual configuration of practice but it is a 
hybrid bloc that unites practices from diverse masculinities in order to ensure the 
reproduction of patriarchy.”43 For example, homosexuality does not conform to the 
inherent heterosexual nature of hegemonic masculinity, therefore, it is deemed 
undesirable and marginalized through cultural norms and discourse.44 Interestingly, the 
idea of masculinity in a culture can change from generation to generation, making the 
hegemony malleable. As Connell and Messerschmidt explain:  
…. hegemonic masculinity appropriates from other masculinities 
whatever appears to be pragmatically useful for continued domination. 
The result of this dialectic is not a unitary pattern of hegemonic 
masculinity but a ‘historic bloc’ involving a weaving together of multiple 
patterns, whose hybridity is the best possible strategy for external 
hegemony. A constant process of negotiation, translation, and 
reconfiguration occurs.45 
Despite the undesirable characteristics of the marginalized or subordinate masculinities, 
some characteristics that are deemed threatening are engulfed by the hegemonic 
masculinity to ensure the reproduction of patriarchy. Therefore, with the appearance of a 
new masculinity, whether it is through the appearance of a new ethnic group or a new 
                                                            
43 Demetriou, 337. 
44 Demetriou writes of the example of homosexuality and its relation to hegemonic masculinity at length 
in his work. 
45 Connell and Messerschmidt, 844. 
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social or political movement, the “exemplary masculinities will have to adapt 
accordingly” to retain the hegemonic position.46   
 The subordination of women, or emphasized femininity, by men, or hegemonic 
masculinity, is the base for Demetriou’s idea of an external hegemonic masculinity. 
However, before examining Demetriou’s external hegemonic masculinity, Connell’s 
notion of emphasized femininity must first be considered. Describing the nature of 
emphasized femininity, Connell wrote, “It is the global subordination of women to men 
that provides an essential basis for differentiation. One form is defined around 
compliance with this subordination and is oriented to accommodating the interests and 
desires of men.”47 The form that is compliant with the subordination and 
accommodating to the interests and desires of men is the ‘emphasized femininity.’ 
Though the emphasized femininity is subordinate to the hegemonic masculinity, 
Connell completes his view of gender relations by noting, 
 It does not imply that hegemonic masculinity means being particularly 
nasty to women. Women may feel as oppressed by non-hegemonic 
masculinities, may even find the hegemonic pattern more familiar and 
manageable. There is likely to be a kind of ‘fit’ between hegemonic 
masculinity and emphasized femininity.48  
Thus, masculinity and femininity, though not equal in a given society, provide a cap on 
the tension that is organically present in gender relations. Connell continues by noting in 
a later work: 
…women are central in many of the processes constructing 
masculinities—as mothers; as schoolmates; as girlfriends, sexual 
partners, and wives; as workers in the gender division of labor; and so 
forth. The concept of emphasized femininity focuses on the compliance 
to patriarchy, and this is still highly relevant in contemporary mass 
culture.49  
It is this compliance to patriarchy by the virtue of emphasized femininity that prevents 
women from obtaining equality with their male counterparts and ending male hegemony 
                                                            
46 Demetriou, 342. 
47 Connell (1987), 183-184.  
48 Ibid, 185. 
49 Connell and Messerschmidt, 848. 
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in political institutions.  
It is the emphasized femininity, lacking any sort of hegemony even within its 
own category, which is subordinated in Demetriou’s concept of external hegemonic 
masculinity rather than the other masculinities. This external form of hegemonic 
masculinity both subordinates the emphasized femininity as well as relies on its 
subordination and continual marginalization in order to exist. According to Demetriou, 
the concepts of masculinity and femininity are themselves built upon a foundation of 
domination and, therefore, produce gender inequality. It is this inequality that makes up 
gender relations and practices, and is subsequently and continuously reinforced 
throughout generations, despite the hybrid nature of masculinity.  Accordingly, 
Demetriou succinctly writes, “Hybridization is thus a strategy for the reproduction of 
patriarchy.”50 The ever-changing nature of hegemonic masculinity, through its internal 
and external nature, along with the role of women in constructing and supporting 
masculinities allow for the hegemonic status of masculinity in society.  
 Connell’s idea of an emphasized femininity, however, has come under criticism 
for its inability to address the multiplicity of femininities that exist, that like hegemonic 
masculinity, continually evolve.  Mimi Schippers writes of multiple femininities that 
can co-exist in a culture, as well as the existence of a hegemonic femininity. Hegemonic 
femininity, however, evolves and changes to support the subordination and dominating 
features of hegemonic masculinity. Schippers expands on Connell’s implication that 
multiple femininities do exist, but notes that Connell focuses more on the multiple 
masculinities rather than on examining the supportive characteristics of the multiple 
femininities to the reproduction of patriarchy.51 
 Pyke and Johnson, in their study of white femininity and Asian femininity, 
emphasize the relation between hegemonic masculinity and hegemonic femininity by 
noting:  
We are not arguing that hegemonic femininity and masculinity are 
equivalent structures. They are not. Whereas hegemonic masculinity is a 
superstructure of domination, hegemonic femininity is confined to power 
relations among women. However, the two structures are interrelated 
                                                            
50 Ibid, 349 
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with hegemonic femininity constructed to serve hegemonic masculinity, 
from which it is granted legitimacy.52 
Pyke and Johnson point out some very necessary ideas in understanding the relationship 
between the two hegemonies. While hegemonic femininity holds power to dominate and 
subordinate other femininities, it is still subordinate and dominated by hegemonic 
masculinity.  
Schippers supplements Pyke and Johnson as well as Connell by exploring 
subordinate femininities, which she calls pariah femininities, and hegemonic femininity. 
Schippers expands on hegemonic femininity from the characteristics of masculinity by 
noting, “To complement these characteristics in a way that subordinates femininity to 
masculinity, femininity includes physical vulnerability, an inability to use violence 
effectively, and compliance.”53 The characteristics of femininity are antonyms to the 
characteristics of masculinity, but these antonyms imply a lesser value in the culture and 
society rather than a simple oppositional category. The hegemonic femininity does not 
exist to overpower or eventually take over hegemony from masculinity, but it exists to 
prevent the subordinate or marginalized forms of femininity from becoming a threat to 
the hegemonic masculinity. It is the enforcement of both hegemonic femininity and 
masculinity in the culture of a nation that perpetuates the quantitative inequality of 
women in governmental representation in post-communist states. 
The characteristics of subordinate, or pariah, femininities that are stigmatized 
“include having sexual desire for other women, being promiscuous, ‘frigid’, or sexually 
inaccessible, and being aggressive.”54 These characteristics deviate from what is 
expected of the relationship between masculinity and femininity and threaten to assume 
characteristics of hegemonic masculinity, making it very important for these 
femininities to be contained by the hegemonic femininity. Schippers prefers the term 
‘pariah femininities’ because these femininities are not necessarily inferior, but possess 
a threat to the relationship between masculinity and femininity that would normally 
allow for the domination and subordination of women. Pariah femininities are seen as 
                                                            
52Karen D. Pyke and Denise L. Johnson, “Asian American Women and Racialized Femininities: ‘Doing’ 
Gender across Cultural Worlds,” Gender and Society, 17, 1 (February 2003), 50-51. 
53 Schippers, 91. 
54 Ibid, 95. 
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not being vulnerable, able to use violence, and assertive in a way that is non-compliant 
to the subordination of women via hegemonic masculinity. 
  The characteristics taken on by pariah femininities, Schippers notes, are not 
seen as masculine qualities, but as both feminine and undesirable.55 The qualities, such 
as being assertive or attracted to women, usually associated with masculinity, are no 
longer seen as masculine when associated with pariah femininities, because associating 
females with masculine characteristics could threaten the hegemony of masculinity. 
These seemingly masculine qualities when enacted by the pariah femininities are 
‘simultaneously stigmatized and feminized,’56 removing the ability for them to become 
a threat to hegemonic masculinity. Justin Charlebois adds to Schippers by stating, 
“Significantly, pariah femininities threaten to dismantle the heterosexual matrix and 
remove hegemonic masculinity from its extolled position.”57 Therefore, the job of 
hegemonic femininity, in a sense, is to contain the undesirable qualities that are present 
within Schippers’ term “pariah femininities.” 
Schippers writes further, “It is cultural insurance for male dominance that 
anybody who enacts or embodies hegemonic characteristics that do not align with their 
gender category is stigmatized as problematic and feminine.”58 It is this insistence on 
associating the feminine with undesired characteristics that perpetuates gender 
inequality in a culture. Even if the female exhibits characteristics of hegemonic 
femininity, she will not be able to exude characteristics associated with males in 
leadership positions for fear of those characteristics being stigmatized and seen as 
unnatural for a woman. Even women who do not possess the characteristics of 
hegemonic femininity must face stigmatization for not following the norms of 
hegemonic femininity, but also for not adhering to the necessary hierarchy for ensuring 
peaceful or institutionalized gender relations and the subordination of hegemonic 
masculinity.  
With this, it can be argued, that women in powerful positions, such as a 
parliamentarian or Minister in a government, must continuously possess the qualities of 
hegemonic femininity in order to be accepted culturally. However, even within the 
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parliaments, the women who are present are continuously marginalized by their male 
counterparts, other women parliamentarians, as well as by the normative nature of their 
cultures. Women must embody masculine characteristics in order to enter into the realm 
of politics and be seen as an equal, or they must continue with their emphasized 
femininity in order to create a balance. However, Schippers, points out that this is 
seemingly impossible for women to achieve, since women exuding masculine 
characteristics are never seen as masculine, but are degraded to being abnormal or 
feminine and women exuding feminine characteristics are resigned to subordination by 
masculinity. Thus, along with the presence of pariah femininities in institutions of 
power, marginalized masculinities and femininities may pose a threat to the structure of 
gender relations through certain characteristics they possess. Despite the ability of the 
subordinated masculinities and femininities to potentially topple the structure, it is the 
unique ability of hegemonic masculinity to incorporate those threatening characteristics 
into its own discourse, thus recreating hegemonic masculinity, and preventing it from 
being overtaken.  
This, however, is not to say that hegemonic masculinity could not be overtaken 
or that the existing regime of gender relations could not be rattled. Demetriou and 
Connell focus on gender relations, highlighting the importance of the interaction 
between masculinity and femininity. Connell and Messerschmidt write:  
Gender relations are always arenas of tension. A given pattern of 
hegemonic masculinity is hegemonic to the extent that it provides a 
solution to these tensions, tending to stabilize patriarchal power or 
reconstitute it in new conditions. A pattern of practice (i.e., a version of 
masculinity) that provided such a solution in past conditions but not in 
new conditions is open to challenge—is in fact certain to be challenged.59 
It is argued by Connell and Messerschmidt that hegemonic masculinity exists in order to 
provide a release for the tensions within gender relations. Connell uses the term ‘gender 
regime’ to explain the ‘the state of play in gender relations in a given institution.” 60 The 
seemingly concrete gender regime of hegemonic masculinity in any given institution 
continues to determine gender relations, always coming out on top.  
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Opposition to the gender regime that has subordinated women throughout the 
decades can be seen among women’s movements. The women’s liberation movement in 
the United States called patriarchy into question through its demands for gender 
equality; yet, men still dominate institutionalized power.61 It is with this failure of the 
women’s liberation movement that Demetriou notes “…the hegemonic bloc changes in 
a very deceptive and unrecognizable way. It changes through negotiation, appropriation, 
and translation, through the transformation of what appears counter-hegemonic and 
progressive into an instrument of backwardness and patriarchal reproduction.”62 It 
seems as though the change and transformation of the hegemonic bloc associated with 
the subordination of women is never-ending, leaving women forever marginalized and 
excluded from the public realm.  
 Despite the bleak outlook for a continuation of an unequal gender regime, 
Connell and Messerschmidt do offer solutions to the issues of gender inequality. 
Connell and Messerschmidt write of the contestation of hegemonic masculinity that  
…occurs continuously, through the efforts of the women’s movement (at 
the local, regional, and global levels), among generations in immigrant 
communities, between models of managerial masculinity, among rivals 
for political authority, among claimants for attention in the entertainment 
industry, and so on. The contestation is real, and gender theory does not 
predict which will prevail—the process is historically open. Accordingly, 
hegemony may fail. The concept of hegemonic masculinity does not rely 
on a theory of social reproduction.63  
The idea that the gender regime and hegemonic masculinity can be toppled, allowing 
for a new hegemonic power to take its place, is intriguing. Hegemonic masculinity is 
not required to be reproduced, but most certainly has remained in the post-communist 
nations of Poland and Estonia, as well as elsewhere across the globe.  
Furthermore, Connell and Messerschmidt write that the “conceptualization of 
hegemonic masculinity should explicitly acknowledge the possibility of democratizing 
gender relations, of abolishing power differentials, not just reproducing hierarchy.”64 
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Connell supports the idea of a ‘politics of alliances’ that combines forces that would 
dismantle hegemonic masculinity.65 Despite regime change in Central and Eastern 
Europe, hegemonic masculinity remained on top, reforming itself to envelop 
democratic ideals while retaining masculine tendencies that prevent gender 
equalization. Additionally, the transition from communism to democracy and 
capitalism and the nascent women’s movement that appeared in Central and Eastern 
Europe did not usurp the old gender regime, but, in many cases, evolved the hegemonic 
bloc into one that embraced nationalist and traditionalist values, again leaving women 
outside of the realm of power and inside the walls of domesticity.  
It is with the idea that hegemonic masculinity continually suppresses 
equalization in gender relations and reinforces the subordination of women in power 
structures, that the examination of trends in female representation in Poland and Estonia 
will be considered. Hegemonic masculinity can be viewed on a local, regional, and 
global level, according to Connell.  Connell wrote, “It is possible for the local pattern to 
depart from the global pattern, even to contradict it. Such departures may provoke 
‘policing’, i.e., attempts to establish the global pattern locally as a norm. They may also 
signify structural tension that leads to large-scale change in the longer run.”66 
Central and Eastern Europe constitutes a region that has gone through the 
transition from communism to democracy and capitalism in recent history, making the 
examination into the foundations of hegemonic masculinity and its role in gender 
relations intriguing at a regional level. Connell and Messerschmidt expand by saying, 
“… regional hegemonic masculinity shapes a society-wide sense of masculine reality 
and, therefore, operates in the cultural domain as on-hand material to be actualized, 
altered, or challenged through practice in a range of different local circumstances. A 
regional hegemonic masculinity, then, provides a cultural framework that may be 
materialized in daily practices and interactions.”67 With the admission of Poland and 
Estonia to the European Union, a further regional, even global, set of norms, ideals, and 
concrete laws and directives were imported into the increasingly globalized societies. 
The influx of globalized norms, such as gender equality, into the post-communist states 
has adjusted the hegemonic power of masculinity to where gender inequality has 
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become part of public discourse. In addition to norms and values, and more 
importantly, the admission to the EU witnessed the adoption of directives and laws to 
aid in greater gender equality in both Poland and Estonia. The laws and directives help 
to enforce the idea of gender equality, and its importance for the future of the two 
countries within international organizations, and potentially reshape the concept of 
hegemonic masculinity at a regional level. 
Despite the presence of different cultures in Poland and Estonia, a similar 
hegemonic masculinity reigns in each culture, preventing women from meaningfully 
obtaining power positions. Additionally, the identification of hegemonic femininity and 
oppositional femininities in the cultural and regional context will be important in 
examining the continuation of gender inequality in political institutions in both Poland 
and Estonia. The European Union also provides an additional gender regime to take 
into consideration in contemporary Estonia and Poland, providing additional potential 
for a shift in gender relations towards equality.  
 
 
2.2 Methodology 
 
This study was completed with an interdisciplinary purpose, relying on a variety 
of sources from both a historical and contemporary pool of work.  A comparative case 
study of Estonia and Poland was chosen in order to analyze the effects of Connell’s 
concept of hegemonic masculinity on the proportion of female representatives in a 
national parliament in two post-communist states. The comparative case study allowed 
further analysis of hegemonic masculinity within different cultures and also allowed 
hegemonic masculinity to be better demonstrated in the upper echelons of the societies. 
By looking at two separate countries, the effects and presence of hegemonic masculinity 
appears more prominent instead of a single analytical examination of a post-communist 
state.  
A study of the historiography and history in regards to gender equality of each 
country was completed, as it is their past and culture that seemingly makes each country 
different, yet they continue to have similar results in regards to the proportion of female 
representatives at a national level.  The work also relies on secondary source analysis in 
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regards to its theoretical framework, taking from scholars, whose work has built on one 
another, resulting in a thorough and comprehensive theoretical framework for analysis. 
From the theoretical framework, the study employs the use of statistical and historical 
references to build an argument to explain why there were and continue to be so few 
women in the representative bodies of Estonia and Poland.  
 In order to understand the appearance of women and the views of society of 
women in the upper echelons of power, this study makes extensive use of previous 
surveys that have been completed in the two countries, either by their governments or 
by outside NGOs. The analysis of governmental legislation and governmental programs 
is also employed in this work, such as the legislation on gender equality adopted in the 
21st century in Poland and Estonia. The statistical analysis was completed by using 
online analysis tools through Inglehart’s World Values Survey or by citing statistical 
data from published surveys and polls. Through the statistical data, a more complete 
picture is formed on the potential changes in attitudes and beliefs of not only women, 
but the whole society through transition and post-transition in the examined countries. 
 In an attempt to gather information on the contemporary mindset of female 
parliamentarians from Estonia and Poland, a standardized survey was sent electronically 
to each member, of which thirteen Estonian and seventeen Polish women responded. 
The current female members of the Polish Sejm and Senate and Estonian Riigikogu were 
chosen as respondents, as they are the population this thesis seeks to analyze. The 
survey was conducted through an online survey generator and consisted of thirteen 
questions. The first set of questions aimed at obtaining basic information, such as 
whether the parliamentarian was married, had children, and possessed higher education 
beyond secondary school. The first set of questions sought demographic information in 
order to understand the scope of the population surveyed in respects to categorical 
assumptions and gender stereotypes present in the cultures. Additionally, each 
respondent was asked to identify their political party in each respective country’s 
national parliament. The political affiliation was asked to obtain information on the 
parliamentarian’s identity and where the majority of female parliamentarians lie on the 
political spectrum, as the respondents were told that they could remain anonymous. 
Furthermore, to explore what led to the respondents into a career of politics, 
questions were asked as to how long one had been in politics, had one always wanted to 
29 
 
be a politician, and what led one to choose the path of politics. These questions were 
asked on the understanding that the political realm is monopolized and characterized as 
a masculine occupation, and the respondents were asked to weigh in on what led them 
into politics. The remaining questions of the survey were created to gauge the 
importance and acceptance of gender equality within the parliaments of Estonia and 
Poland. The respondents were asked if they considered themselves a feminist, as much 
of the scholarly literature suggests the negative connotations associated with the term, 
the survey sought to gauge contemporary attitudes, although from minimal proportion of 
women in the overall population. Moreover, the respondents were asked if they believed 
female leaders are accepted as leaders in their country, whether women’s issues were 
heard by men in the legislative process, and if the respondent had found it difficult, as a 
woman, to be engaged in politics in their country. The answers were provided on a 
multiple choice scale, starting with a wholly positive and ending with a wholly negative 
response to the question, with variations situated between the two extremes. 
Therefore, based on research of the above-mentioned materials, this thesis seeks 
to answer the following questions: Why was there a sharp drop in female representatives 
at the transition from communism to democracy in Estonia and Poland? What are some 
trends that can be identified? Why do women continue to occupy much less than half of 
all the seats in the respective representative bodies?  
This study wishes to show that although previous arguments of women’s apathy 
and the weakness of women’s movements have worked to explain specific aspects of 
the transition and post-transition periods, they do not account for the overall 
phenomenon of few women parliamentarians in the post-communist states. By 
examining the different situations, beliefs, and legislation in a post-Soviet republic such 
as Estonia and a post-communist Central European state like Poland, the thesis attempts 
to develop a useful and meaningful comparison of the post-communist states, leading to 
the same result: low numbers of female parliamentarians. 
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CHAPTER 3  
THE ESTONIAN CASE STUDY 
 
 
3.1 Historical Background 
 
The Republic of Estonia, reestablished in 1991, is a state with a population of 
1.3 million inhabitants that lies in the northeastern part of Europe.68 The Estonians 
possess a distinct culture, language, and history within the context of Eastern Europe 
and its post-communist neighbors.  Estonians often identify more with the Nordic and 
the Scandinavian countries, especially their Finnish neighbors to the north, with whom 
they share a related language.69  However, Estonia shares much of its recent history with 
the former Soviet Union. Estonia experienced a tumultuous history laced with 
occupation and integration into great empires. The most recent, and perhaps most 
painful, imperial experience was the second Soviet “occupation” that Estonia endured 
from 1944-1991. Kevin O’Connor aptly describes the Baltic States, “In light of this 
seemingly unending series of catastrophes, it is a wonder that the three Baltic countries 
exist at all and that the cultures and traditions of their peoples have managed to survive 
at all.”70 The endurance of the Baltic peoples throughout numerous occupations is 
venerable, and the success of Estonia throughout the transition to democracy and 
capitalism is admirable. 
Jaago notes that two important changes occurred for Estonia in the early 20th 
century, “there was a move towards the development of a modern society and Estonia 
                                                            
68 Kevin O’Connor notes,“In 2004 Estonia’s population dropped to about 1.35 million, down significantly 
from the 1.573 million people counted in the last Soviet census, which was taken in 1989 when the Baltic 
countries were still republics of the USSR.”  in Kevin O’Connor, Culture and Customs of the Baltic States 
(London: Greenwood Press, 2006), 4. 
69 Ibid, xi-xii. 
70 Ibid, xi. 
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achieved independence as a state in 1918.”71 Estonia experienced its first period of 
independence during the inter-war years, gaining independence after the Great War 
ended in 1918.  Freed from the Russian Empire and Soviet Russia, Estonians created a 
state built on Western ideals, taking the Weimar Constitution as a model when creating 
the Estonian republic. Women under the first Estonian republic gained numerous rights 
without having to organize to demand these rights, including the right to vote in 1918.72 
Estonian women gained the right to vote before their counterparts in many Western 
countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom.73 Despite gaining the 
right to vote, women in interwar Estonia did not possess equal representation with their 
male counterparts in the institutions of government.74  
 Since Estonia became an independent country in the era of nationalism and 
conflicts between the Great Powers, gender issues were not the primary concern of the 
fledgling state, but were “subordinate to national and class concerns [and] no women’s 
movement of any consequence existed to advance the cause of gender equality.”75 The 
separation of gender roles and the lack of concern for gender equality through the 
segregated peasant roles of which O’Connor writes, though certainly not unique, 
provide a backdrop to the history of gender relations in modern-day Estonia. The lack of 
importance that has been given to gender equality in Estonian society, as with many 
countries, is a recurring theme in the small country’s history.  
O’Connor points out that the position of women in Estonian history has been one 
of caring for the men and the rearing of children. Rather than possessing a firm interest 
in matters in the public realm, Estonian women were placed within the home in 
Estonian society. According to O’Connor, the view of women as caretakers that was 
prominent in peasant society laid a foundation for the gender relations that continue into 
20th century Estonian society. This point in O’Connor’s argument, pointing to the role of 
women in Estonian society in the late 19th-early 20th centuries, is much more relevant to 
modern Estonia, instead of the emphasis on a prevalent peasant culture. There is still a 
                                                            
71 Tiiu Jaago, “What Actually Happened in Estonian Political History- Stories of the 20th Century Events 
from the Viewpoint of Popular Narrated History,” Elore, 13 (January, 2006), 3. 
72 O’Connor, 71. 
73 Ibid, 71. 
74 Ibid, 71. 
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segregation of labor within Estonia, with women confined to social welfare positions 
and men in more powerful political positions, that is reflected in contemporary society.  
Furthermore, the relative lack of religiosity in Estonia, as compared to Poland 
for example, has given Estonia the reputation of one of Europe’s most secular 
countries.76  The weak state of organized religion in Estonia hindered the emergence of 
a religious foundation for gender relations and gender roles in Estonian society.  As 
noted above, Estonia had prevalent traditional roles present in its culture without 
reference to Christianity to influence the view of women, in effect leaving the argument 
of the importance of religion for culturally determined gender relations invalid and 
unsupported in this particular case. Interestingly, however, as O’Connor notes, women 
in the traditional cultures of the Baltic States have been viewed favorably as goddesses, 
possessing respectability and honor.  Women, therefore, in the traditional cultures, were 
“transmitters of Baltic cultures.”77 Therefore, though women were confined to 
domesticity, traditionally they were not viewed with disrespect. However, with the 
modernization of society, traditional gender relations prevented women from equally 
participating in public life.  
This follows Connell’s idea that though women are not mistreated, it does not 
necessarily mean that they are not subordinated within society. A hegemonic 
masculinity can be identified throughout Estonia’s history. From the separation of 
gender roles in O’Connor’s identified peasant culture to the importance of women in 
Estonian culture as imparting culture and values to future generations, a separate 
masculinity and femininity emerges. Historically in Estonian society, women have been 
confined to the private and seemingly less powerful sector of society, while men have 
exerted their hegemony through the public realm, through nationalist discourse or 
community leadership.  
Though Estonia has experienced numerous changes since the days of its first 
independent republic, the domination of men in the public and political realm and the 
reign of hegemonic masculinity, though certainly transformed since its conception, 
continue to this day. By examining Estonian women under Soviet rule, an understanding 
of women’s experiences and subordination can be developed. A look at women in 
politics during the transition and Estonia’s reestablishment is also warranted in order to 
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fully understand the situation of Estonian women in politics today and prospects for the 
future. 
 
 
3.2 Estonian Women Under Soviet Rule 
 
 Estonia became a republic of the Soviet Union in 1940 as a result of another 
conflict between great powers. The results of the conflict left behind Estonia’s 
independence in exchange for enforced Soviet rule, which was followed by the German 
invasion of 1941, but was restored in 1944. With Soviet rule, however, came Soviet 
ideology, including the contradictory ideas and practices on gender equality.  As noted 
above, women were exposed to a double burden under communism, leaving little time 
and space for political activity. Helemäe and Saar point out, “Soviet norms and 
institutions rested on the premise that women, but not men, had dual roles; thus 
legislation favored a traditional division of gender roles; for example, childcare leaves 
were only available for mothers.”78  The continuation of the segregated gender roles 
prevented the placement of women in the upper echelons of power in the Estonian 
Soviet Socialist Republic. 
The absence of women in the upper echelons of power was noted by Gail 
Lapidus in her 1978 work Women in Soviet Society, and yet her statement still holds 
true, “Despite considerable efforts to integrate women more fully into political life and 
some success in drawing women into political careers, in the Soviet Union, as 
elsewhere, women are largely absent from the upper reaches of power. In substantive 
rather than ceremonial roles, in the key hierarchies of political and coercive power, and 
at the apex of the system as a whole, politics remains a male affair.”79 As Estonia was a 
part of the Soviet Union, few women, if any, ever participated in the upper ranks of the 
republic’s central committee.  
 Despite the lack of women in the upper echelons of Soviet power, women did 
grace the ranks of party leadership, though they were put into stereotypical roles, such 
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as the head of the Party Central Women’s Department, which was reserved for a woman 
to head it. This position “accounted for one of the four women to hold a leadership 
position in Estonia between 1956 and 1973.”80  Perhaps even more interesting is that 
women in Estonia possessed higher education than their male comrades, yet were 
virtually absent from the decision-making body of the Estonian Soviet Socialist 
Republic. 81  Despite the higher education levels of Estonian women than men, and often 
the highest in the Soviet Union, Gail Lapidus notes further, “Estonia and Lithuania, for 
example, have had only half as many women in positions of leadership at the republic 
level as Latvia, while the largest numbers of women are found in some of the Central 
Asian republics, where the promotion of women to high level positions within the Party 
and government has received great attention.”82  
Although women were present in the local soviets and as deputies to the 
Supreme Soviet with the help of gender quotas, they held little actual power. The 
argument could be made that no one held real power in the local soviets or the Supreme 
Soviet, but the lack of women in the republic and union soviets was quite alarming 
considering the egalitarian promises of Soviet ideology. Anu Laas expands further on 
the quotas for women by saying, “Since Soviet-era quotas were further complicated by 
issues of class, patronage and manipulations of the Communist Party, their effectiveness 
as mechanisms of inclusion and equality was completely discredited.”83 The 
inefficiency of the Soviet government, false promises of gender equality, and the 
seemingly useless nature of even having representatives in Soviet institutions left many 
women, as well as men, disillusioned and uninterested in the workings of government or 
participation in it. The underrepresentation of women, regardless of their education, is a 
conundrum that exists to this day in the Riigikogu, leaving one to question the cultural 
foundations of the gender relations in Estonia and their persistence through the years, as 
well as the continuation of the hegemony of masculine qualities in terms of a state’s 
leadership. 
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3.3 Estonian Women in Transition, 1989-2004 
 
Piotr Sztompka made an eloquent observation on the importance of the year 
1989, and therefore, it is fruitful to quote him at length: 
 The year 1989 was not only a political break from an autocratic, mono-
party regime toward a parliamentary, multiparty system—the ultimate 
victory of democracy; nor was it an economic break from a socialist, 
planned, command economy, to a basically free, capitalist market—the 
second birth of capitalism. Neither was it the radical transformation of 
institutions, or the restitution of some earlier social order—‘the return’ to 
Europe, to the West, to ‘normality’ or whatever. Rather, it started the 
reconstruction of a new social order from a strange mixture of 
components of various origins. It was a major culture and civilizational 
break, a beginning of the reconstruction of the deepest cultural tissue as 
well as civilizational surface of society, the slow emergence of the new 
post-Communist culture and civilization.84  
The ‘reconstruction’ that Sztompka describes was quite evident in Estonia during the 
transition. Sztompka argues that a new civilization emerged following the break with 
communism. Shirley A. Woods adds, “Unlike other Soviet republics, Estonia did have a 
pre-Soviet civic culture from which to draw experience of political pluralism.”85 The 
break was certainly felt in Estonia, but often with a reversion to the traditional gender 
roles and the reemergence of an increasingly male presence in the representative bodies 
and government that had characterized Estonian society throughout its pre-Soviet 
history.  
The fall of communism following the heralded Singing Revolution in Estonia 
left Estonia to confront the implementation of a representative democracy and free 
markets without the aid of its eastern neighbor. The uniqueness of the Estonian case 
during the transition has been explained in the following terms: ‘In Estonia, the Soviet 
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doctrine never reached the position of ideological hegemony…Double-think and 
double-behavior was widespread because of the occupation, and because of the strong 
ties to pre-World War II society and to the Western world at large.” 86 Additionally, 
Marju Lauristin suggests that “Westernization (in the case of Central-European and 
Baltic countries it is really re-Westernization) is the most important systemic aspect in 
the transition process.”87 Estonia sought the acceptance and aid of its newly supportive 
Western neighbors, which allowed Estonia to refer back to its first period of 
independence in the interwar years for inspiration. Nevertheless, the turn to the West 
was neither easy nor painless for the Estonians. 
Estonian transition began in 1990, and was met with many difficulties.88 
However, despite the economic difficulties, “Estonia took a very liberal approach, with 
few barriers to labor market dislocations or new job creation, meager support of the 
unemployed, and no effective wage floor.”89 The liberal approach for the Estonians met 
with ‘considerable success’ in the ‘politics of democracy,’ leaving Estonia as an 
admirable example of democratic transition after the early years.90 Despite the liberal 
approaches taken by the Estonian government, the reforms influenced women’s 
situation more than they did their male counterparts. Although women are guaranteed 
equal rights in the Estonian constitution, “women have seen only marginal improvement 
in their situation; in some respects, the condition has actually worsened since the Soviet 
collapse.”91 Much of the literature written on Estonia and its women deals with the labor 
force and economic position of women compared to their male counterparts. Women’s 
unemployment at the time of transition and throughout the 1990s exceeded that of men, 
with an average 38.3 percent of women and 24.7 percent of men facing unemployment 
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throughout the decade. 92 Women also made significantly less in terms of wages and 
salaries than Estonian men, a phenomenon that continues to this day.93 
The liberal economic approach to the transition paid off for the Estonians in the 
long run, but the transition period saw the women’s movement focusing on problems 
concerning violence in the Soviet army until its evacuation, alternative education, 
reproductive health, home economics and setting up a business, rather than the inherent 
gender inequality that became more pronounced with the collapse of communism.94 
Although women’s organizations and associations were able to voice their opinions and 
thoughts after Gorbachev’s policies of glasnost and perestroika, the women’s 
movement at the time of transition focused on helping women in traditional female 
roles, rather than attempting to embrace gender equality through female political 
activism, equal wages, and better female representation in the Riigikogu.  
The legacy of unequal representation carried on into the reestablished Estonian 
state. The lack of a feminist agenda or focus on gender equality in Estonia at the time of 
the transition can be attributed to the lack of interest in feminism or in the type of 
gender equality that the Soviet Union and ideology supposedly represented.  Although 
the goal of gender equality was present in Soviet propaganda, it was not enforced in 
practice, despite the use of gender quotas. If anything, the Soviet Union further 
promoted the continuation of rigid gender roles by allowing conservative beliefs to 
prevail as specifically Estonian and going against the Soviet policies, preventing gender 
equality and women from exercising real political power. Raili Marling write in her 
discourse analysis of Estonian print media, “…Estonia had a back-lash against feminism 
before it developed a viable feminism.”95  Marling continues, “…the dominant 
discourse created a ‘spectre of feminism’ it battled with and banished, for the sake of the 
‘progress’ of the nation, a context where feminism became a scapegoat for various 
social ills and a  means for distracting attention from deep-seated gendered inequalities 
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in the society, but possibly, also other social concerns.”96 Feminism, therefore, was used 
as a distraction rather than a solution, as Marling notes. 
Furthermore, the discussion and discourse on gender equality and feminism was 
often confined to academic halls and journals, rather than through promotion of public 
discourse generally accessible to all Estonians.97 The weak middle class, the 
contradictory nature of Soviet ideology, the difficult economic transition, the absence of 
a public discussion of feminist solutions, and the return of nationalism and traditional 
norms left the women of Estonia out of political office and out of echelons of power in 
the newly democratic state of Estonia. These forces culminated in the success of a 
hegemonic masculinity, preventing the realization of greater gender equality at the time 
of transition. 
Additionally, the 1990s witnessed a decline in the public’s trust in the Riigikogu 
as well as a decline in the overall interest in politics. Inglehart’s World Values Survey, 
which was conducted in Estonia in 1990, 1996, and 1999, provides valuable information 
on how Estonians viewed politics and how much confidence they had in the functions 
and abilities of the Riigikogu. Estonian interest in politics declined throughout the 
decade, with 32.9 percent respondents identifying politics as rather important in life in 
1990 and only 18.2 percent responding in a similar fashion in 1999.98  In regards to the 
confidence held in the Estonian Riigikogu, in 1996 40.6 percent of respondents 
expressed quite a lot of confidence in the Riigikogu compared to just three years later, 
where only 24.1 percent of respondents expressed quite a lot of confidence in the 
national parliament.99  
The increasingly low trust and confidence in the newly democratic political 
institutions is further complicated by the inequality witnessed within the political 
institutions throughout the transition period. The drastic decline in women in national 
parliaments at the time of transition led many to speculate about the true causes of 
gender inequality that existed in the post-communist countries, including Estonia. The 
number of women in representative bodies in Estonia went from around 30 percent in 
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the late 1980s to around 12 percent in the first free parliamentary elections that occurred 
in 1992.100 The percentage of women in the Riigikogu remained around 12 percent, 
experiencing no fluctuation in the two elections that took place between 1992 and 
1995.101 The disappearance of gender quotas for the representative bodies as well as the 
façade of gender equality triumphed by Soviet ideology led to bleak results and outlooks 
for women’s representation, the addressing of women’s issues at a national level, and 
the development of a successful women’s movement in post-communist Estonia. 
Moreover, in the elections for president, only one woman, Lagle Parek, the first 
Minister of the Interior, was a candidate. Parek received four percent of the national 
vote in September 1992, failing to continue on, where Lennart Mari prevailed in the 
second round.102  Estonia has yet to seriously consider a woman for this ceremonial, 
though important post in the Estonian government.103  Furthermore, a woman never held 
the more powerful position of Prime Minister or post of county governor during the 
transition period, and still has not held either position.104  The World Values Survey 
results from 1996 indicated that 28.7 percent agreed strongly and 40.5 percent agreed 
that men make better political leaders than women do.105 These views were certainly 
reflected in the low numbers of women in leadership positions in the Estonian 
government at the time. 
Despite the small number of women in the Riigikogu during transition, 
O’Connor optimistically and somewhat foolhardily writes, “Although conditions remain 
far from ideal—women, for example, are underrepresented at the top of party lists—
women in the Baltic countries have never had greater opportunities to participate in 
public life.”106 Though women are able, and have been able since the Gorbachev era, to 
participate in public life, the progress necessary for the equality of women’s voices 
during the transition period was minimal, and women were continuously 
underrepresented in the Riigikogu. Furthermore, such low interest in politics and 
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confidence in the Riigikogu in the 1990s left for much to be desired. Only in the latter 
half of the 1990s and early 2000s did public acknowledgment and a discourse on the 
inherent gender inequality develop about the gender inequality present in the institutions 
of power in Estonia. 
More recently, women have faced better representation than the dismally low 
percentages of women in the Riigikogu seen during the transition, but women still make 
up less than a quarter of representatives in the Riigikogu and even fewer women are 
seen at a ministerial level, let alone the presidency or Prime Minister. Despite the rise of 
Ene Ergma to president of the Riigikogu in 2003, women are still mostly absent from the 
upper echelons of governmental power. Throughout the period from transition to today, 
women in the Riigikogu, and women as a whole in Estonia, have attained higher levels 
of education than their male counterparts, yet continue to comprise of only a minority of 
the positions in the government and the Riigikogu. The transition period saw the 
stagnant level of women at 12 percent in the Riigikogu. Since then, the percent of 
women in the national parliament has risen and remained around 22 percent, but the 
number of women in ministerial positions continues to fluctuate.  
From 1995, when women made up only 12 percent of the 101 representatives in 
the Estonian Riigikogu, to the current make-up of the representative body, where women 
make up around 19 percent of the body, progress has been made.107 An additional five 
females were elected to the Riigikogu in the 1999 elections, producing a 5 percent gain 
for women. That spike, however, has not been repeated in the elections since 1999, 
producing a percentage that hovers around 20 percent. 
 
 
3.4 Estonian Women after Transition, 2004-2012 
 
The transition period came to a fruitful end for Estonia in 2004 with its 
admission into the European Union and NATO, thus fully integrating the republic into 
the international community. The Republic of Estonia also passed a Gender Equality 
Act on April 7, 2004, which entered force in May of the same year.  Furthermore, 
though low confidence in the Riigikogu was prevalent throughout the transition period, 
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from 2004 onward, the Estonian public began to gain trust in the institution. In addition 
to greater trust, the proportion of female representatives in the Riigikogu remained 
around 18 percent in the 2003 elections and boosted to almost 24 percent percent in the 
2007 elections.108 
The relative stabilization and increase of the percentage of women in the 
Riigikogu noted above cannot be ascribed to the proportion of women in ministerial 
positions. In 2005 Estonia could boast of having women make up 15 percent of its 
senior minister positions, yet in 2009, the percentage had been lowered to only 8 
percent.109 Overall, the average percentage of women in the government of Estonia from 
1999-2004 was 22 percent.110 Although the percentage of women in the Riigikogu has 
risen, it is still below the levels seen under communism, as well as the European 
average. 
Moreover, according to the Eurobarometer, a tool created by the European 
Commission to analyze the public opinion of EU member states, 41 percent of Estonians 
surveyed in October 2004 tended to trust the national parliament, with 51 percent 
tending not to trust the institution.111 This denotes an increase in trust in the political 
institution among Estonians compared to the transition period. The public trust in the 
national parliament reached an apex in May 2007, where 60 percent of Estonians polled 
expressed that they tended to place trust in the national parliament, where only 34 
percent noted that they did not trust the institution.112 However, as the post-transition 
period progressed, Estonians declined in their views of the Riigikogu and the trust they 
placed in the institution, with results from November 2011 indicating only 29 percent of 
respondents tending to trust the parliament and 65 percent noting they did not.113  
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Despite the rise in the number of female parliamentary representatives and the 
rising trust in the parliament in the post-transition period, Liina Järviste, in her policy 
analysis of gender equality in Estonia, after reviewing the Gender Equality Monitoring 
survey conducted in 2009, writes “Nearly half of the people believe that the position of 
men in Estonian society is somewhat or significantly better than the position of 
women.”114 Järviste continues, “Gender inequality is quite common in Estonian society, 
despite the fact that equality is guaranteed by law. Evidence to that effect can be found 
in gender wage gap, higher level of poverty among women, and shorter lifespan of 
men.”115 In fact, Estonia possesses the highest gender wage gap, a staggering difference 
of about 30 percent, in the European Union.116  Jaarviste emphasizes, however, that “the 
wage gap is not a result of different wages paid to women and men in equivalent 
positions in the same organization,” but is a result of a gendered labor force.117 Women 
and men occupy separate sectors within the labor force, with women making much less 
than men in their respective occupations.  The gender pay gap, however, was recognized 
as a problem by the Estonian government, and in September 2011 the action was begun 
to reduce the alarming pay gap in the country.118 
Interestingly, however, Jaarviste notes that ‘gender equality is not a ‘female 
thing’; it concerns men as well and is necessary for the entire society. 119  Therefore, the 
policy analysis focused on both angles of gender inequality, calling for a comprehensive 
reexamination of the issue in Estonia.  Järviste also notes survey questions posed to 
other ethnic groups, mainly Russians, in Estonia. Their responses showed a more 
conservative view on gender equality than the ethnic Estonians, adding a significant 
conservative proportion to Estonia’s overall society.120 The large Russian minority in 
Estonia will have to be involved in the public discourse on gender equality in order for 
that part of the population to accommodate the increasing notions of gender equality in 
Estonia. 
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A survey of thirteen of the twenty-two current female parliamentarians in the 
Riigikogu yielded a valuable insight into the thoughts of those women currently sitting 
in the unicameral legislative body of the Estonian government. Thirteen questions were 
posed and thirteen parliamentarians in the Riigikogu anonymously responded to the 
survey.  Though seven respondents are married serving in the Riigikogu, there was a 
significant minority of five women who are not married in the Riigikogu.121  Seven 
respondents indicated that they are married and ten of the women have children, 
implying that these women are responsible for both their household tasks and careers.  
The division of household tasks in an Estonian family, notably, has not changed to any 
degree, leaving women parliamentarians largely responsible for the housework.122 
Additionally, although these women are still responsible for the majority of household 
work, on average they still possess a higher level of education than their male 
counterparts in the parliament.123  
The respondents were spread out among the four parties present in the 
Riigikogu: The Social Democratic Party (Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erakond), Pro Patria and 
Res Publica Union Group (Isamaa ja Res Publica Liit), the Estonian Reform Party 
(Eesti Reformierakond), and the Estonian Centre Party (Eesti Keskarakond). 
Additionally, seven of the respondents had been in the Riigikogu for four or more terms, 
suggesting the women had developed a reputation for effective service as legislators by 
continuously being reelected. Surprisingly, only one respondent entered the parliament 
as a new member in the last elections in 2011.  
Only five women surveyed had always wanted to be in politics, with the 
majority noting that they had not planned to be politicians, but circumstances had 
allowed them to pursue that career track. Laas notes, “Women fear being labeled, being 
caught in the ‘media fire’ or giving ‘wrong’ answers in public debates.”124 The fear of 
exposure in the public realm can cause apprehension for women who may otherwise 
seek political office to promote change. Moreover, seven women responded that they 
have found being a woman in politics somewhat difficult, with four replying that they 
had not found it difficult.  
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Participation in politics in Estonia has not been generally popular in recent years. 
Anu Laas continues,   
Participation in political parties is also low; in 2002, it did not exceed 
four percent of the total population. Survey data show that active 
participation in politics is still low, but interest in politics has slightly 
increased. According to Estonian data from the European Social Survey 
(2004, Round II) only 2.5 percent say that they are members of a political 
party, and 51 percent voted in last elections. In 2004, 36 percent said that 
they were interested or very interested in politics.125  
The lack of interest in politics shown by Estonians as a whole can contribute to the lack 
of female candidates and representatives. Helen Biin, in her work on the influence of 
political parties on women’s representation in the Riigikogu, found “that women are 
neither highly motivated nor confident enough to aspire for higher office. The lack of 
confidence and motivation among female politicians was repeatedly highlighted in 
interviews.”126 The lack of confidence may be attributed to the lack of support for 
women’s political participation in public opinion, since the public realm is traditionally 
viewed as a masculine area of dominance.  
Additionally, being put on the top or towards the top of the list makes a great 
difference in the outcome of an election for women. Laas notes, “According to surveys 
on participation in politics, the open list feature of the Estonian electoral system implies 
that only women who are among the first ten or 20 candidates on a list are likely to be 
elected.”127 Therefore, it is imperative that women be placed on the upper part of the 
lists, which are often decided by men. 
The idea of women as leaders in Estonia is also a contested area. The majority of 
the women representatives in the Riigikogu who were polled responded that they felt as 
though women are somewhat but not fully accepted as political leaders in Estonia.  The 
lack of broad public acceptance of women as political leaders prevents more women 
from gaining seats in the Riigikogu. Moreover, when asked, the respondents to the 
survey answered that although women are present in the parliament women’s issues are 
only sometimes heard or not heard as often as they should be by the men in the 
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government. This lack of support by men in addressing women’s issues, Laas point out, 
leads to the result that “even women who are highly respected tend not to speak out on 
women’s issues.”128 The women who are present in the Riigikogu are seemingly limited 
in their attempts to enact change through present institutions and norms, resulting in 
little change or transformation in women’s issues or gender inequality. 
Nine of the women surveyed believe that gender equality is a problem in 
Estonia, with only two respondents believing it was a major problem in Estonia. Most 
noted that other areas such as the economy take precedence, while four replied that 
gender equality was not an issue in Estonia. This statistic among the female 
parliamentarians is reflected in Järviste’s policy analysis when she writes, “For instance, 
only 6 percent of Estonian residents believe that gender inequality is a serious social 
problem (Kaha 2009). There is a widespread belief that the past inequality has been 
abolished: women and men are equal before the law and women can be seen in active 
roles in various areas of social life, incl[uding] among decision-makers.”129 The popular 
belief that past inequality has been abolished does not aid in the development of gender 
equality throughout Estonia. Put simply, most Estonians are seemingly not interested in 
gender equality.130 However, Järviste notes an improvement, stating, “The main 
conclusion is that the level of awareness of gender inequality and the need for equality 
is not high, but has increased somewhat in comparison to 2005. Women are more aware 
of gender inequality and have also had more experiences with inequality. In addition, 
women expressed greater support for equality.”131 By gaining the support of women, 
though slowly and gradually, a glimmering hope of further awareness of gender 
inequality and the need for change exists in Estonia.  
The negative connotations of feminism, despite the transition years and further 
integration with the West, continue in Estonia. When asked if they would consider 
themselves a feminist, nine of the polled parliamentarians responded in the negative, 
with only three noting that they would consider themselves one. Interestingly, a 
divergence with the anti-Soviet ideology which guided the transition appears when 
eleven of the respondents believe that gender quotas are a good idea, with eight 
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responding that they fully approve the implementation of gender quotas. Women who 
are active at the national level and are active party members tend to be more supportive 
of the idea of reintroducing quotas than women who are active at the local level or those 
who are involved in women’s organizations.132   
However, overall, gender quotas are often opposed in Estonia despite the 
implementation of quotas throughout the EU. Opponents argue that quotas are an 
extreme measure, that there are not enough competent women to fulfill the quotas, 
quotas humiliate the women included in them, and most interesting, “Women 
themselves are not interested in [having] a position with responsibilities.”133 To combat 
these arguments, the Estonian government has implemented a program, “Promotion of 
Gender Equality, 2011-2013,” in an attempt to promote gender mainstreaming in 
governmental policies and to promote overall gender equality in Estonia. Opinions such 
as those above, though they may be the minority opinion, will be difficult to combat.134 
The arguments against gender quotas are quite interesting, as Estonia often identifies 
with the Nordic nations, where gender quotas are commonplace and have been 
successful in creating greater equality in governmental bodies, but Estonia continues to 
lack quotas for political representation. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), in a report on gender equality in Estonia 
from 2005, noted, 
The reasons for the widespread inequality mostly lie in traditional gender 
roles and stereotypic belief that women and men have preconditions and 
skills that are inborn and not acquired. The gender-prejudiced 
environment favours the persistence of discriminating attitudes and 
primarily restricts women’s participating in social, economic and 
political life. It can be said that there is still resistance in society to 
improving the social representation of women through gender quotas, 
and such resistance can be seen among the political elite, as well as in the 
public opinion among women’s organizations themselves.135  
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Despite prevailing traditionalist views among many Estonians, the integration of Estonia 
into international organizations as well as its admission to the European Union has had a 
great impact on gender equality policies.  By adopting the acquis associated with 
admission to the European Union, Estonia had to adopt updated gender equality laws to 
reflect the European Union’s goal of gender equality. Estonia did not adopt the Gender 
Equality Act, an act that had been debated for years, until 2004.136  Under Article 2, the 
Act also created two new institutions, the Gender Equality Commissioner and the 
Gender Equality Council, to monitor compliance to the law.137 The law prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of gender and encourages gender equality to be promoted in 
public places. 
Moreover, Anu Laas describes the changing views of women who had become 
involved in international NGOs and organizations, noting: 
From 2001–2004, women’s NGOs garnered more knowledge of equal 
opportunities and women’s rights. The women’s movement became more 
interested in politics than it had been in the 1990s. Women signed a 
shadow report presented to the United Nations Committee on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). 
In autumn 2002, 60 Estonian women’s NGOs signed a letter of support 
for the Gender Equality Bill.138 
The involvement of women’s NGOs and a commitment to gender equality in the 2000s 
provides hope for Estonian women in achieving equality not only under the law, which 
has been guaranteed, but also within society.  
 With the accession to the EU in 2004 as well as the adoption of the necessary 
laws, came the ability to send representatives to the European Parliament. As of 2012, 
three of the six members of Estonia’s delegation to the EP are women, Siiri Oviir, 
Kristiina Ojuland, and Vilja Savisaar-Toomast.139 Though Estonia only sends six 
representatives, it places Estonia among the more progressive states in the European 
Union in this sense. However, the equality represented in Estonia’s European 
Parliamentary delegation may speak to the seemingly less pressing matters of the EU 
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compared to those discussed in the Riigikogu, thus the receptivity to women in this 
position. 
Gender equality in Estonia is on its way to being incorporated into public 
discourse through government initiatives with partial credit going to the influence of 
international organizations, such as the EU, which has begun to affect gender relations 
in Estonia, allowing for more discussion and consideration. With the continuation of 
such discourse and interaction with international organizations, women in Estonia may 
begin to experience greater income equality and political representation in the coming 
decades.  
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CHAPTER 4  
THE POLISH CASE STUDY 
 
 
4.1 Historical Background 
 
Poland, a country situated in the heart of Europe, had an equally tumultuous 
history throughout the twentieth century.  Poland has a population around 38 million 
and consists of about 98 percent ethnic Poles. The homogeneity of the Polish nation 
makes possible a unique analysis of Polish culture and norms in regards to gender 
inequality. Poland did not become a modern sovereign nation-state until 1918 with the 
end of World War I, but had thrived as a cultural nation for centuries. Women gained 
the right to vote, alongside men, in 1918, including ‘the right to choose and to be 
chosen.’ 140 
 The interwar period saw the restoration of an independent Poland under Józef 
Piłsudski, who led a government that is much celebrated in Poland today. Before the 
Second World War, women possessed dismally low percentages in the Sejm and Senat, 
possessing two percent and five percent of the seats respectively.141 World War II 
devastated Poland, stripping it of its statehood in 1939 by the Germans and Soviets, 
before it became the firing ground for both the Nazis and Soviets. Poland’s experience 
in the Second World War left many disheartened and embittered in Polish society. The 
influence of Soviet-style communism spread to Poland after the war, leading to the 
establishment of the People’s Republic of Poland, which lasted until 1989.  The twists 
and turns of the Polish story line after 1989 have led to a democratic state that has been 
at the forefront of the post-communist transition in Central and Eastern Europe. 
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Although the percentages of women in the Sejm increased after World War II, 
traditionalist notions of the role of woman in Polish society remained.  Anna Titkow 
notes that the late reincarnation of statehood, following over a century of division and 
foreign rule, “created the model of the heroic Polish woman coping with all sorts of 
burdens.”142 This model woman was supposed to bring up children while “maintaining 
the national language, culture, and religious faith.”143  The role of the Catholic Church is 
monumental in Polish culture, placing the fundamentals of Church teaching at the 
foundation of Polish society. These values admired in Polish women, the Matka Polka, 
for almost all of its history continued during communist times and made the role of 
women in Poland strikingly different than that of the role of the Western woman, who 
had not faced years of strife and national persecution. The tumultuous history of the 
partitions, independence, and then communist rule under Soviet domination 
strengthened the adherence to traditions in Polish Catholic culture, since stability has 
been fleeting in the modern period. 
The role of the Catholic Church has been pivotal in Polish history and culture. A. 
Kemp-Welch, in his history of Poland under communism, writes, “As always in Polish 
history, the Church served as a repository of national ideals and as a sanctuary in times 
of trouble.”144 The Catholic Church is what has enabled Poles to preserve their national 
identity, especially during the onslaught of war, Soviet communism, and the painful 
transition to democracy and capitalism. Most notable is the idea that “the Church would 
never compromise its ethical principles with any materialistic ideology.”145 The 
permanence of the Church in Polish society suggests a permanence of the ideas about 
women and men in Poland, and leaves the hope for achieving greater gender equality 
somewhat blocked by a religious wall. 
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4.2 Polish Women Under Communist Rule  
 
With the installation of a Soviet-style system after World War II, Poland once 
again faced foreign domination and isolation behind the Iron Curtain.  The ideology of 
communism allowed for women potentially to be seen as equals among men, but Polish 
women were still required to be strong and persevere in retaining Polish cultural values, 
namely the values associated with the Catholic Church.  By retaining its Catholicism, 
Poland was able to create its own form of communism, distinct yet still connected to the 
Soviets.  Women, under communism, as noted above, enjoyed relative equality with 
their male comrades on paper.  The ideology of communism provided that all workers 
and citizens were equal and worked for the common good of society, even if society was 
lacking in the many material advances seen under capitalism. This supposed gender 
equality was rooted in the ideology of communism, but would take up a defensive 
position against the values and traditions of the Catholic Church innate in Polish society. 
Elzbieta Oleksy highlights: 
Formally, in the period of roughly forty years after the Second World 
War, Polish women enjoyed rights that Western women might have 
envied. In agreement with the Marxist doctrine that women’s 
emancipation entails their integration into the labor market, the Polish 
Constitution of 1952 gave women full civil and political rights, as well as 
access to most trades and professions, many of them formerly in the male 
preserve. The state legalized abortion and divorce and declared (though 
never fully realized this promise) to provide free child care facilities.146  
The Polish Constitution of 1952 provided women with many rights, including the right 
of employment in traditional male-dominated professions, as well as rights to divorce 
and abortion. With admission into male trades and professions, the opportunity came for 
greater gender equality through the labor force and the potential for women to hold 
equal positions of power in the communist government. However, this was simply not 
the outcome of the Polish Constitution of 1952. 
Although the lives of most women under communism were not luxurious, they 
did not face dramatic and outright gender inequality under communism as they were to 
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face with the introduction of capitalism and democracy. The socialist system “promoted 
gender equality in education, labor, leisure, family, and public life.”147 Equality in 
leisure time, although it was promoted in the ideology, could hardly be seen during 
communist times.  Not only did Polish women have to work in the labor force in 
building socialism alongside their male comrades, but they also had to be in charge of 
the household. 
Małgorzata Fidelis has written an excellent study of women in postwar Poland, 
emphasizing the situation of women under communism and the industrialization of the 
postwar period. Fidelis examines the shift in the government policy on women from 
promoting their participation in the labor force to shifting and placing them in confined 
gender roles within the occupations, all within two decades. The drastic change in 
policy led Fidelis to write, “Women were to enter en masse into jobs traditionally 
performed by men, but those jobs were now redesigned as exclusively or primarily 
female jobs. Through the policy of ‘regendering from above,’ the socialist workplace 
offered a peculiar kind of gender equality, in which the boundary between men’s and 
women’s work ‘was redrawn, but not erased. Thus the persistent reassertion of sexual 
difference in employment policies reinforced a gender hierarchy that the communists, 
paradoxically, sought to obliterate through instituting political and legal equality of the 
sexes.”148 
Fidelis continues, “Although Soviet leaders were just as eager as their Polish 
counterparts to demote female workers, Poles continued to believe that women in the 
new occupations represented a Soviet imposition on Polish national culture. For them, 
strengthening gender hierarchies was also a way to reassert national identities and set 
themselves apart from the Soviets.”149 Fidelis interestingly argues that the reversion to 
prewar gender stereotypes at the end of the communist era was a result of Poles 
reasserting their nationality and culture, which had been usurped by communism. Thus, 
gender equality was something associated with communism and separate spheres for 
men and women were Polish, and important to retain. Fidelis notes, “A woman 
performing a man’s job was a threat not only to proper femininity but to Polishness as 
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well.”150An example of this reversion of gender norms can be witnessed with the drastic 
drop in the number of female representatives emerging from to the first elections of a 
democratic Poland.  
The first years of communist Poland saw attempts at extensive industrialization, 
requiring the recruitment of women into the labor force and the ‘tendency to break 
through traditional attitudes against professional work for women and their participation 
in social and political life.”151  Following the Stalinist era, a change in policy towards 
women’s roles in Polish society became prevalent in the second decade of communist 
rule. Władysław Adamski writes:  
A reorientation of policy regarding women occurred in the years from 
1955 to 1957: greater attention was not being given to the family than to 
professional work for women. In the 1960s, the trend was to equalize the 
two approaches to the role of women in society. A new element of social 
policy appeared to continue the approach adopted in the first years of 
extensive industrialization, while emphasizing the role of the woman as 
mother, wife, and housekeeper.152 
The change in policy towards women was reflected in the number of women 
represented in the Sejm. Małgorzata Fuszara, in her examination of women in the Polish 
parliament in the communist period, cites 17 percent of women in the Sejm in the period 
1952-1956.153 The rise in female representatives correlates with the more egalitarian 
approach towards women’s roles in society and government in general in the first 
decade of communist rule. Interestingly, however, a dramatic decline was noted in the 
second term, 1956-1961, where women only accounted for four percent of the 
deputies.154 For the rest of the 1960s and 1970s, women made up an average of around 
14 percent of deputies in the Sejm.155 The 1980s saw a rise of women in parliament, 
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averaging around 21 percent of the deputies, yet the transition to democracy led to a 
sharp drop in women’s representation.156 
Małgorzata Fuszara and Eleonora Zielińska warn of false impressions in their 
analysis of women’s representation during the communist period, by stating: 
 Any attempt to evaluate women’s impact on the law during that period is 
futile, since citizens had no real influence on the legislative process 
because all decisions were made by the Central Committee of the Polish 
United Workers’ Party [PSPR]. Since the representation of women in 
that body was purely symbolic, it is highly probable that any decisions 
made were in fact undertaken by men. After the collapse of Communism, 
the gender distribution of power did not change considerably.157 
Fuszara and Zielińska argue that although Polish women, and men, possessed 
representation in the Sejm, they did not hold any power.  Siemienska goes on to note, 
“The presence of female faces was thus ensured, but these women did not represent the 
best and brightest of Polish society.”158 However, despite the lack of the “best and the 
brightest” women, the symbolism of women in any institution of power was important 
for retaining and promoting a female presence in the public realm, even if it was largely 
a façade under the communist regime. Moreover, very few women held positions in the 
government itself, and “the few that were only played a symbolic role to ‘prove’ that 
there was not discrimination.”159 The “symbolic role” played by these women was an 
important step in allowing the public to see women in politics, despite the seemingly 
useless nature of the governmental positions that they held. Ania Plomien notes, 
however, that the communist government did attempt to enact the policy of gender 
equality through institutionalization with the creation of the Office of the Government 
Plenipotentiary for Women’s Affairs in 1986.160 This office was “to ensure the equal 
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status of women and men in government, political, economic, social and cultural 
arenas.”161 
 With the end of communism in Poland at the hands of Solidarity and the Church, 
the transition to democracy and capitalism began in full force in 1989, and women’s 
role in the transition was as marginalized as it had been in the seemingly powerless 
positions they held in the communist government. It must be highlighted, however, that 
though women were involved in Solidarity, and “the movement relied heavily on 
women’s involvement, it did not address women’s concerns.”162 Shana Penn, in her 
seminal work on women’s involvement in Solidarity, notes, “But the Solidarity men 
consistently overlooked the movement’s heroines, who, for their part, did not challenge 
the subordinate position they were allotted.”163 Penn’s work examines the work of the 
women that kept the underground newspapers alive during martial law in Poland. 
Interestingly, the majority of the women did not claim their role as leaders of democracy 
in Poland, but rather, stood aside as the public faces of Solidarity, all men, took the 
acknowledgement for Solidarity’s success. Moreover, as Oleksy writes, “The 
achievement of these women has been erased from collective memory.”164 The 
avoidance of women’s issues by Solidarity and its new government undermined the 
emergence of a women’s movement and support for women during the transition, 
leaving those women who had helped take down communism in Poland disheartened 
and left out. 
 
 
4.3 Polish Women in Transition, 1989-2004 
 
The class distinctions that plague capitalism were not seen to such an extent 
under socialism.  The shaky economy and newly implemented free market led to the 
loss of many jobs that had been guaranteed under communism.  This new economic 
reality was no different in for Polish citizens and oftentimes could not be supported by a 
single income, but women’s participation in the labor force was particularly 
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jeopardized.165  Male hegemony in politics, industry, and other traditionally masculine 
sectors reappeared, leaving many women unemployed and floundering to support their 
families.    
This exclusion and inequality of women in the workforce led to one of the 
contradictions in returning to traditional gender roles in Poland.  Although some women 
were seemingly happy to return to the sphere of domesticity, others were forced to seek 
employment in order to support their families while the economy stabilized.  However, 
with the rise of the Catholic influence in Polish political culture and society, women 
were once again viewed as inferior to men in the public realm.  This led to inequality in 
wages, labor, and job availability along with little say in the political or economic 
transition.  These prejudices made it possible for many women to find employment at 
all, despite their high levels of university education.166   
Poland is a relative success story in the transition to democracy and free markets 
from an authoritarian government and command economy because it “sought to 
embrace neoliberalism quickly and thoroughly.”167 However, the development of 
capitalism and democracy in Poland brought about a reversion to traditional gender 
roles that were seen before the communist era. Although the first Polish post-communist 
government and its successors were quick to adopt democratic principles, their adoption 
of gender equality or recognition of women’s issues as a concern for society has been 
slow.  The importance of women in Polish society did not go unnoticed in Poland, but 
continuation of the exclusion of women from the political realm remains problematic.  
The immense amount of pressure on women during communist times to work in 
both realms placed a great burden on women, making the arrival of capitalism and 
democracy and a return to the traditional gender roles welcomed by many women.168 
Based on the Catholic Church’s values and norms, women were to return to the 
domestic realm to raise families and take care of their husbands, whereas men were to 
remain as breadwinners for their growing Catholic families.  This traditional dichotomy 
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suited the women who had been subject to the double burden during socialist times of 
participation in the labor force and maintaining an ideal communist household.   
In addition to the double burden for women Polish citizens, like Estonians noted 
above, during the transition period also expressed decreasing confidence in the Sejm. In 
1990, Inglehart’s World Values Survey noted that 18.9 percent of Poles surveyed held a 
great deal of confidence in the parliament, compared to the 7.8 percent recorded in 
1999.169 The loss of confidence in the institution of a country’s representative body does 
not bode well for the body being a garden for the fostering of gender equality within a 
state during the time of transition.  
Plomien notes, “In contrast to the previous era, the state’s dedication to equal 
opportunities (even if mostly superficial) and women’s professional activation was not 
sustained through the transition period.”170 The superficial attempts at gender equality 
were eradicated with the transition. Even the institutionalization of gender equality in 
1986 with the Office of the Government Plenipotentiary for Women’s Affairs was 
undermined by converting the office ‘into the Office of Undersecretary of State for 
Women and Family with new responsibilities for family, children and youth.”171 The 
inclusion of family and youth into the Office of Women’s Affairs further placed women 
in the stereotypical role of wife and mother, rather than focusing exclusively on the 
important women’s issues that were present with the transition, such as unemployment 
and poverty. Furthermore, a survey conducted in 1995 by the Center for Public Opinion 
Research (Ośrodek Badania Opinii Publicznej) noted that a majority of Poles felt that 
women were worse off in their professional and social lives than their male 
counterparts, with only 23 percent believing women and men were equal in this area.172  
Both Urszula Nowakowska and Ania Plomien point to the rise of the political 
right and cultural conservatives at the time of transition in Poland, which affected the 
position of women in society. Plomien writes, “The right-leaning government went as 
far as advising women to return to their households and take up their motherly and 
wifely duties in order to make jobs available for men.”173 As Nowakowska, writing in 
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the mid-1990s, noted, “The Catholic Church and closely cooperating right-wing parties 
have created a very unfavorable political climate for women’s rights. They propagate 
traditional, patriarchal models of the family, with a man at its head.”174 The rise of the 
right-wing and the power of the Church showed itself during the transition, filling the 
void that Marxist ideology had once occupied. The Church in Poland, at the time of 
transition and since its completion, has promoted “women’s role as wife and mother and 
as the only morally correct one.” 175  Therefore, women were not encouraged to seek 
public office or attempt to obtain equality in the institutions of power. Nowakowska 
concluded, “Instead of building a pluralistic society, we have just replaced quasi-
religious Marxist ideology with the only one right doctrine, namely, that of the Catholic 
Church.”176 
The rise of the right as well as the Church’s increasing political role in the early 
1990s was reflected in the dramatic drop in women’s representation in the Sejm and 
Senate. Women made up only 9.56 percent, or 44 seats, of the 460 member Sejm after 
the 1991 elections.177 Women fared somewhat better in the 1993 elections, winning 60 
seats, raising their presence in the Sejm to 13 percent.178 Although women faced low 
levels of representation, “a positive initiative to overcome such prejudice was taken up 
by a cross-party group of women politicians.”179 Barbara Einhorn describes the initiative 
by female parliamentarians:  
Defying resistance from male politicians, they set up in spring 1991 the 
first ever Parliamentary Club of Women Deputies under the chair of 
Barbara Labuda. Forty of the total 62 women deputies in the Sejm and 
seven female senators joined. They saw the function of this Women’s 
Caucus as monitoring women’s interests in relation to legislative changes 
under consideration by the Polish Sejm.180 
The cooperation among women in the Sejm and Senat provided hope for advancing 
women’s issues in Poland as well as promoting the presence of women in parliament. 
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The club also sought to delegitimize the stereotypes of women held by male 
parliamentarians. 
Moreover, the appointment of Anna Popowicz was an example of a woman 
promoted to the upper echelons of the post-communist Polish government. 
Nowakowska wrote, “When, for example, Walesa appointed a minister of women’s 
affairs, the bishops appealed for a minister who was Catholic, married, at least forty 
years old, and with two or more children. They got what they wanted, but they 
overlooked the fact that Miss Popowicz did not support a ban on abortion.”181 Popowicz 
was eventually dismissed, but her appointment and the creation of the Under-Secretary 
of State for Women and Family Affairs was often cited as Poland’s attempt at becoming 
European in the eyes of Western media.182 
Another example of a woman that reached high levels in the Polish post-
communist government was Hanna Suchocka. Her appointment as Prime Minister in 
1992, at first glance, appeared as a victory for women’s representation in post-
communist Poland. The abortion debate at the time of transition caused much 
controversy in Poland, especially among right-wing conservatives who sought to ban 
abortion entirely.  Therefore, “Hanna Suchocka was elected to the post as a compromise 
candidate, not because she is a constitutional lawyer, nor because of her term as 
Poland’s representative on the council of Europe, but precisely, it seems, because of her 
uncompromising stance in opposition to abortion.”183 Suchocka was not an advocate for 
women’s issues, and though she was in a prime position to promote a platform for 
gender equality, she looked to pass a ban on abortion in Poland through the Polish 
parliament. Suchocka, as Einhorn described her, “seem[ed] both to epitomize and to 
laud the traditional view of women’s qualities currently espoused by so many political 
ideologues in East Central Europe.”184  
Female politicians, like the former Prime Minister of Poland, Hanna Suchocka, 
have not wholeheartedly emphasized or advocated for women’s rights in the political 
realm, so many women are not convinced or influenced to vote for these women.185  
Hanna Suchocka, though the Prime Minister of Poland, characterized the qualities that 
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are found in Connell’s emphasized femininity and Schippers’ hegemonic femininity 
rather than characterizing a figure determined to create change in Poland’s rigid gender 
stereotypes at the time of transition. Though she was in the minority when appointed, 
she was appointed because of her conservative views that would allow for the 
continuation of subordinating women in Polish society from the top to the bottom. 
Katja Guenther goes on to explain why the women’s movement has not been 
successful in Poland by noting that there has been little encouragement for the public 
inclusion of feminist goals in national politics.186  Furthermore, Monika Platek writes, 
“Contrary to popular belief, one women Prime Minister, one woman Chair of the 
National Bank or one woman Minister will not change the social situation or image of 
women. Women who hold high office do not become supporters of women’s rights just 
because they themselves are women. In fact, they often act to the contrary.”187 Although 
women in politics exist in Poland, they do not thoroughly advocate for women’s rights, 
but are more conservative-oriented and side with traditional Catholic values.188 If 
women cannot be confident that women in the political realm will advocate their rights, 
then the apathy of women in the political realm will continue in Poland. The drop of 
female representatives in parliament in addition to the lack of effective females in top 
positions during the transition period left a bleak foundation for the involvement of 
women in politics in Poland. 
The turbulent transition for Polish women had certainly settled by the beginning 
of the 21st century as compared with the early to mid 1990s. The contradictions and 
further burdens brought on by capitalism should not be viewed in such a negative light, 
however.  Only time can tell if these burdens are to lessen and Titkow provided an 
optimistic outlook on the future of gender equality in Poland in stating, “The political 
and economic transformation going on in Poland, however negative it may appear for 
women, should be seen as only a factor modifying the process of achieving gender 
equality.”189  Titkow’s hope for gender equality has made some progress in Poland, but 
today’s Polish woman continues to face a difficult time in regards to gender equality on 
a governmental level. 
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The governments during the second half of the period of transition, particularly 
from 1993 to 1997, came from the left side of the political spectrum, and “were more 
involved in promoting equal opportunities, especially after the 1995 Women’s 
Conference in Beijing.”190 Furthermore, a National Action Plan for Women was 
embraced, which sought to fight poverty among women, provide access to education 
and medical care, fight violence against women, and ‘institutionalizing mechanism for 
the advancement of women and facilitating women’s involvement in power and 
decision-making.”191 Of course, these policies did not last long, but the fact that they 
were developed, showed progress for the liberals in Poland by providing a voice for 
women.  
 The return of a conservative government in 1997, however, “questioned the need 
to introduce an equal status bill, to investigate pay and gender equity in the labor market 
or to introduce a political quota system.”192 The backwards step by the conservative 
government in women’s issues was once again addressed by the new government in 
2001, which was again from the left side of the political spectrum.193 This pattern leads 
Plomien to observe “that the process of crafting a new gender contract is one 
characterized by progress and retreat, depending on the political orientation of the 
administration in power.”194 Gender equality, however, is addressed in the 1997 Polish 
Constitution,  
Article 33 of the Constitution states that ‘men and women shall have 
equal rights (…) regarding education, employment and promotion, and 
shall have the right to equal compensation for work of similar value, to 
social security, to hold office, and to receive public honors and 
decorations.195 
The 1997 Constitution ensured gender equality in all aspects of life in Poland, but a long 
battle still lay ahead for a better framework of gender equality in order for women to be 
truly equal in Polish society. Furthermore, the role of the Plenipotentiary for Equal 
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Treatment, which was created in response to EU discussions for accession, through its 
years of transformation and changes in its title, is now responsible for what is in its 
namesake, equal treatment throughout Poland.196 The number of females in ministerial 
positions rose from 7 percent in 1995 to about 25 percent in 2005.197  
The percentage of female representatives in the Sejm and Senat remained quite 
low throughout the transition period, and the 1997 elections did not provide women with 
any progress, with only 13 percent of the Sejm consisting of female parliamentarians.198 
The following election years, however, appeared as great victories for women in Poland. 
A leap of seven percent was seen with the 2001 elections, allowing for 93 women to 
join the ranks of parliamentarians.199 Interestingly, ‘of those women that were elected to 
parliament, 61.3 percent were new to politics.”200 A further public opinion survey was 
conducted in 2002 asking, “What is it like to be a Woman in Poland?” The survey noted 
that nearly half, 47 percent, of Polish citizens believed that is was better to be a man in 
Poland than a woman, indicating the continued subordination of women in Polish 
society, despite increased numbers of female representatives in the Sejm.201 
Renata Siemienska has devoted much of her research to this pivotal election year 
that saw a substantial increase in women in the Polish parliament. Siemienska notes, 
“The 2001 parliamentary elections were a turning point for women in Parliament, due in 
part to the implementation of the new electoral law.”202 The new law reduced the 
number of districts, which in turn, increased the constituencies. The reduction of 
districts as Siemienska explains, ‘gave an advantage to larger parties, which needed to 
fill their party lists with more candidates and were therefore inclined to add more 
women to them. As a result of these changes, substantially more women were elected to 
both the Sejm and the Senate.”203 Siemienska expands on the larger parties, by noting 
their adoption of gender quotas: 
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 [the]Coalition of Democratic Left Alliance-Labor Union as well as the 
liberal-center Freedom Union, accepted the rule that neither of the sexes 
should be represented by less than 30 percent of all candidates, and lists 
presented for individual constituencies should comply with this 
condition. Moreover, even right-wing parties, such as the League of 
Polish Families, were influenced by these changes.204 
Despite the adoption of gender quotas by individual parties, no national quota was 
enforced and the selection of candidates was still made entirely by men.205 Fuszara and 
Zielińska, writing in 2006, added that since the fall of communism, ‘few political parties 
took women’s questions into consideration. Many parties did not address women’s 
issues at all, and some did only in the context of the family and women’s roles within 
the family.” 206 Siemienska notes in her study that, ‘The problem of the equal status of 
women and men, women’s political participation and other women’s issues were rarely 
included in party programs for the 2001 electoral campaign.”207 Although the greater 
number of women in parliament ‘reflected changes in attitudes toward women in 
politics,”208 the lack of acknowledgment of women’s issues by the political parties and 
leaders showed little hope for a true change in gender equality in Poland with the 2001 
elections. 
 
 
4.4 Polish Women After Transition, 2004-2012 
 
The ground-breaking election of 2001 was continued with the success of women 
in the following elections of 2005, 2007, and 2011. The election years of 2005 and 2007 
saw the retention by women of around 20 percent of the seats in the Polish parliament, 
whereas the year 2011 saw further growth in female representatives, with women 
making up almost 24 percent of parliamentarians.209 The rising numbers of female 
politicians in Poland can be counted as a success in some ways in regards to gender 
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equality, yet the road to equality is still bumpy and filled with contradictions and road 
blocks for Polish women.  However, given the continual rise in female representation, 
perhaps the phenomenon of women occupying important positions within institutions of 
power no longer appears as atypical. 
Unlike Estonia, the trust in the Polish Sejm among Polish participants in the 
Eurobarometer surveys from 2004-2012 did not improve in the post-transition period. In 
October 2004, only eight percent of those Poles surveyed tended to trust the national 
parliament, with an alarming 87 percent indicating that they did not trust the 
institution.210 Furthermore, in May 2011 an increase in trust was noted with 25 percent 
of the respondents indicating that they tended to trust the institution of the national 
parliament, whereas 68 percent noted that they did not.211 Though trust in the Polish 
national parliament rose in the post transition period, the increase in trust has been a 
slow process. 
The results of the survey conducted for the Polish case study are skewed in 
favored of the Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska), as the majority of the seventeen 
respondents belonged to that party. However, the percentage of women belonging to the 
Civic Platform are a majority of women serving in the Sejm and Senat, which therefore 
accurately reflects the make-up of women in the two houses. Cooperation of female 
parliamentarians in completing the survey was much harder to come by, despite a much 
larger amount of women in the Polish Sejm and Senat than was seen with the Estonian 
Riigikogu. However, much more research has been conducted on Poland and its post-
communist situation than Estonia, making the survey supplemental to previous research. 
Only one female parliamentarian from Law and Justice (Prawo I Sprawiedliwość) 
responded, as well as one member from Palikot’s Movement (Ruch Palikota), The 
Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratyczne), and United Poland (Soldarna 
Polska). The length of time that the female parliamentarians had been in parliament 
varied much more than in Estonia, with a variety of terms in office recorded.212 The 
majority of women polled said they had not always wanted to be in politics but 
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responded with “I used to think about it, and circumstances allowed for it” or  “It just 
kind of happened to where I joined a career in politics,” when asked how they came by 
the career choice of being a politician.  
Although progress in legislation and representation for women has fluctuated 
since the transition, the equality in education can be seen across the board in Poland, as 
a great many women in Poland hold university degrees.213 This can be viewed as a relic 
of communist times, but remains in Poland to this day.  Polish women continue to 
possess more higher education than their male counterparts. Of those women in the Sejm 
and Senat surveyed for this thesis, all of the women held a degree from institutions of 
higher education.214 Therefore, the reversion to traditional gender roles cannot be 
blamed on the ignorance of Polish women or inequality in education, but rather the role 
of cultural norms and values. 
Furthermore, the use of gender quotas has been enacted recently in Poland, 
creating more potential for women to be representatives. Despite the turbulent past with 
gender quotas, the majority of the survey respondents approve of gender quotas, with 
only five disapproving of them. Interestingly, “In January 2011, an electoral gender 
quota system was adopted for parliamentary and local elections, as well as for the 
elections to the European Parliament. Candidate lists should include at least 35 percent 
of the representatives of one gender.”215 The quota for the candidate list did not 
overflow into the parliamentary seats in 2012, as only eleven of the fifty Polish 
representatives to the European Parliament are women. 216    
Even more intriguing was the formation of the “Women’s Party” in the 2007 
elections. Unfortunately the women’s party was not able to reach the five percent 
threshold, but the presence of a women’s party on the political scene shows great strides 
in Poland’s attempt at gender equality217. The Women’s Party subsequently joined ranks 
with the SLD, a party that “has declared that it would retain a 40 percent gender quota 
on its candidate lists.”218  Additionally, in 2011, “the government comprise[d] 19 
Ministers, including 5 women, who [were] the head of the following ministries: Labor 
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and Social Policy, National Education, Science and Higher Education, Health, and 
Regional Development.”219 Over the past four years, women have made up around a 
quarter of the positions in the government, representing significant improvement, 
though still unequal, in women’s representation in the upper echelons of power in 
Poland. 
Despite the gender quotas and all-female political parties, the majority of female 
parliamentarians that responded found being in politics somewhat difficult for them as a 
woman. Five respondents noted that they felt women are fully accepted as political 
leaders in their country, whereas seven felt that they were somewhat accepted, and four 
responded that women were not really accepted as political leaders in Poland. 
Furthermore, the majority of women felt women’s issues were somewhat or not really 
heard by men in politics, with three responding that they felt as though women’s issues 
were always heard. The improvement in female representation in Poland after the 2001 
elections provides hope for women in Poland, yet, the percentage still lies below a 
quarter of all representatives. With further integration with international norms and a 
curbing of Church influence, perhaps women in Poland will be able to reach achieve 
greater equality in Polish institutions of power and governance. 
With Poland’s accession to the European Union in 2004, the prospects for better 
legal implementation of gender equality improved a great deal. Joining the EU and 
adopting the acquis communautaire certainly strengthened Poland’s framework for 
gender equality.220 Moreover, Poland has agreed to the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEWDAW) as well as the Beijing 
Declaration and Platform for Action.221 Twelve respondents to the survey believe that 
gender inequality is an issue in Poland, with only two believing that it is a top issue.  
With its entrance into the EU, Poland appears to have embraced the legislative 
necessities in creating a framework for gender equality through the increase of female 
representatives in parliament and in government as well as adopting directives and laws 
that combat gender inequality.  
 Through international pressure, Poland has begun to embrace initiatives that 
attempt to tackle the issues of gender inequality. The election of Anna Grodzka to the 
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Sejm in 2011 as the first transgender representative is certainly an example, though a 
sole example, of the changing views within Polish society. Though the Catholic Church 
still holds firm roots in Polish society, the infiltration of international gender norms and 
a more open discourse on gender equality has opened up the processes for change and 
evolution in the Central European country. 
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CHAPTER 5 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
  
 The empirical data collected from this study suggests that despite changes in 
regimes and governments as well as legislation and directives, women have continued to 
be subordinated and unequally represented in the national governments of Estonia and 
Poland. Both Poland and Estonia have experienced a rise in the proportion of female 
representatives in each respective parliament throughout the transition and post-
transition periods. Discrimination among the genders, however, continues in both 
countries, as well as Europe as a whole. A 2012 Eurobarometer survey222 conducted 
throughout twenty-seven EU member states indicated that 31 percent of the respondents 
believed gender discrimination to be widespread, while 54 percent believed it to be rare, 
and six percent believed gender discrimination in the EU to be non-existent. When 
looking at the national level, Estonians appeared to share the general attitude of their 
fellow member states’ opinion with 30 percent of Estonians surveyed believing that 
gender discrimination was widespread, while 58 percent of those surveyed believed it to 
be rare, and 7 percent believed it to be non-existent. Poland, however, tells of more 
traditionalist views, with 21 percent of Poles believing gender discrimination to be 
widespread, 57 percent believing it to be rare, and 15 percent believing it to be non-
existent. The numbers are telling in that although gender inequality persists in Poland 
and Estonia, the surveys indicate that the majority of citizens do not find it to be a 
pressing issue. 
The continuation of few females in the upper echelons of power indicates the 
continued presence of hegemonic masculinity in addition to hegemonic femininity in 
Estonia and Poland, as well as the region as a whole. In this sense, comparison with the 
West does little to explain the phenomenon of low numbers of women in parliament, as 
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many western countries, with the Nordic countries as outliers, possess just as many, if 
not lower numbers of women in their parliaments. Despite the implementation of gender 
equality policies at a national level, hegemonic masculinity continues to possess a hold 
over gender relations at a local level in the post-communist nations manifested in the 
continual unequal ratio between men and women in the upper echelons of society. 
Following Schippers’ argument mentioned above, a hegemonic femininity is 
prevalent in both countries, with women encouraged to remain in traditional, domestic 
roles rather than possessing more public and powerful roles that their male counterparts 
have. As shown, more so in the Polish case, women such as Hanna Suchocka publically 
exhibited notions of a hegemonic, or emphasized femininity by encouraging the passage 
of the abortion bill that would limit women’s reproductive rights. In Estonia, noticeable 
labor segregation can arguably be attributed to the prevailing notion that women belong 
in certain service sectors of the economy, with the realm of politics being excluded from 
the list of acceptable positions for women. 
Though both nations possess a communist past, they diverge in the significance 
of the role of organized religion and the make-up of the government. A hegemonic 
masculinity, though coming from different roots and sources, is prevalent in both 
societies, preventing true gender equality in the upper echelons of power, as well as the 
rest of society. The increase in women in parliaments in both Poland and Estonia since 
the fall of communism can be attributed to the influx of international norms, directives, 
and laws that have been placed upon these societies, such as the EU’s policies on gender 
equality, thus, forcing hegemonic masculinity to reformat itself to allow for the influx of 
the norms.  
Both countries also possessed a markedly low level of confidence in the 
parliaments during the transition period, indicating that though the parliament is a 
representative body, change in the prevalent views on gender and the division of society 
according to sex must take place elsewhere in the respective societies. Though 
Estonians have developed a tendency to trust the Riigikogu, Poles continue to possess 
low levels of trust in the Sejm, noting an area of improvement in regards to the nation’s 
institutions. An international representative body, the European Parliament, however, 
provides an interesting experimental ground of a supranational notion of masculinity 
and femininity among the nations of Europe.  
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Additionally, both countries have adopted EU legislation to enhance gender 
equality in the newer member states, as seen in Estonian with the Gender Equality Act 
of 2004 and in Poland with Article 33 in the 1997 Constitution.  As Connell noted in his 
1987 work, “For the ultimate goal of the transformation of gender relations there are 
two logical candidates. One is the abolition of gender and the other its reconstitution on 
new bases.”223 The accession to the EU provides new foundations from which policies 
and notions of gender equality can be built and expanded. Though women have made 
more progress in Poland in terms of representation, both countries have made significant 
progress in the framework towards gender equality. 
When one examines the trends of women in the upper echelons of Estonian 
society, one finds that despite the various ideologies, from communism to democracy, 
women are still viewed as foreign to the realm of politics and are seemingly unable to 
make great strides in increasing their representation. Thus the cultural foundations of 
Estonian society must be examined in terms of the historical gender relations, rather 
than examining the various ideologies that Estonians endured over the twentieth 
century. Hegemonic masculinity and hegemonic femininity are quite present in Estonian 
society in regards to representation in the national legislative body, with hegemonic 
masculinity controlling the forces of power in society, and hegemonic femininity 
supporting the subordination of women in institutions of power through continued 
allowance and acceptance of the gender roles. 
As for Poland, the role of the Church and the rise of conservative forces are 
often cited for the continued subordination of women in power and politics. Though the 
Catholic Church is important in the culture of Poles, it is also reinforced by the 
underlying notion that in the dichotomy of gender relations, masculinity holds sway 
over femininity, as well as other masculinities, in Polish society. The presence of 
hegemonic femininity can be felt in the lack of support for women’s issues seen in 
recent years by some female parliamentarians of Poland.  
Although the two countries both possess a distinct hegemonic masculinity in 
each society, the root of the inequality is placed in different places in the society. In this 
sense, the importance of organized religion in regards to cultural transmission of what is 
deemed masculine and feminine in Poland should not be overlooked. The role that 
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Catholicism plays in Polish culture and society is noticeably missing in Estonian culture 
and society. The roots that religion has in Poland are a markedly different when 
studying the workings of hegemonic masculinity in Poland.  
The unequal gender relations that have been prevalent for much of Estonia and 
Poland’s existence should certainly not be viewed as permanent, however. With the 
arrival of new norms and mores regarding gender equality, hegemonic masculinity 
could begin to incorporate notions of equality, thus giving away some of its hegemony 
in order to establish peace within gender relations, which, as Connell notes, are always 
an area of tension. After completing the comparative case study it becomes apparent that 
a cultural force is present in each society, though formed from different roots, that 
prevents the equal representation of women and men in the national parliaments in the 
post-communist states examined above. The explanation put forth in this thesis as to 
why this underrepresentation continues, despite regime change and an influx of 
international norms and directives, is the presence of a hegemonic masculinity that 
exists and subordinates women and their ability to obtain equal power in the public 
realm. Finally, through the catalyst of accession to the European Union and adopting 
gender equality legislation and programs, both Poland and Estonia have evolved in 
positive and productive ways in regards to their gender equality practices since the 
democratic transition of the 1990s.  
Unfortunately, the reworking of gender relations requires time and the problem 
of gender inequality cannot be remedied overnight. However, through persistent 
discourse on gender equality and an increase in the number of women’s voices being 
heard, change can occur in all societies. Estonia has made inroads in opening a 
discourse on gender equality through government programs, and Poland has enacted 
gender quotas in hopes of increasing female representation at a national level. Through 
the normalization of women appearing in the upper echelons of power, a greater voice 
for women can be developed, potentially questioning the gender regime that has been in 
place for centuries in Estonia and Poland.   
 This thesis has attempted to uncover an explanation as to why women continue 
to hold low percentages in the national parliaments of post-communist states, with an 
analysis of Estonia and Poland. By using Connell’s and others’ concept of hegemonic 
masculinity, this thesis explained that in the current regime of gender relations, gender 
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equality has not been and will not be realized. It is only through a complete reworking 
of the idea of gender or the incorporation of femininity into power-sharing with the 
masculine ideals that equilibrium will be reached. An in-depth look at the past two 
decades has provided insight into the evolution of gender relations on a national and 
international level in Estonia and Poland.  With the upcoming election years, the 
outlook for women in terms of equality and representation in both counties has 
improved. However, following Connell’s argument, it will take the changing of the 
concept of hegemonic masculinity, which is no easy feat, in each society for the 
subordination of women to cease and a fostering notion of gender equality to become 
prevalent in public discourse.  
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APPENDIX 1 
 
 
 
Below is a copy of the survey sent to the current female parliamentarians in the Estonian 
Riigikogu and Polish Sejm and Senat. The surveys were sent out in Estonian and Polish and 
the respondents answered anonymously. 
 
 
Married: Yes or No 
Children: Yes or No 
Higher Education: Yes or No 
 
Political Party (Choose One):  
Estonia      Poland 
Social Democratic Party    Civic Platform 
Pro Patria and Res Publica Union Group  Law and Justice 
Estonian Reform Party    Palikot’s Movement 
Estonian Centre Party     The Democratic Left Alliance 
       Polish People’s Party 
       United Poland 
 
How long have you been in politics? (both local and national) 
a.  1 term or less 
b.  2-3 terms 
c.  4 or more terms 
 
Have you always wanted to be in politics?  
a.  Yes 
b.  No 
c.  Indifferent 
 
What led you to pursue a career in politics? 
a.   I have always wanted to be in politics. 
b.   I used to think about it, and circumstances allowed for it.  
c.   It just kind of happened to where I joined a career in politics. 
d.   Other 
 
Have you found being in politics difficult as a woman? 
a.   Yes 
b.  Somewhat difficult 
c.    No, not difficult 
 
Do you feel that women are fully accepted as political leaders in your country? 
a.   Yes, fully accepted 
b.   Somewhat accepted 
c.   Not really accepted 
d.   No, not accepted at all 
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Women make up less than a quarter of the upper level government in Estonia/Poland. Do you 
feel as though women’s issues are heard by men? 
a.  Yes, they are always heard. 
b.  Somewhat heard. 
c.  Not really heard. 
d.  Not heard at all.   
 
Would you consider yourself a feminist? 
a.   Yes 
b.   No 
c.   No opinion 
 
Do you approve of gender quotas in politics?   
a.   Yes, I fully approve 
b.   Somewhat approve 
c.   Somewhat disapprove 
d.   No, I do not approve 
 
Do you believe that gender equality is a very important issue currently in Estonia/Poland? 
a.  Yes, it is a top issue. 
b.  It is somewhat an issue, but other issues such as the economy are more important. 
c.  It is not really an important issue. 
d.  It is not an issue at all. 
 
